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The Developing Methodology for
Analyzing Privacy Torts*
By DUNCAN M. DAVIDSON**
and JEAN A. KUNKEL***
The amorphous right of privacy was conceived by Samuel D.
Warren and Louis D. Brandeis to protect a person's ability to
determine "to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emo-
tions shall be communicated to others."' They failed, however,
to define it adequately. 2 The confusion that ensued regarding
the legal basis for this tort remains with us today.3 As societal
patterns for privacy narrow and technology for its invasion
grows more sophisticated each day, it becomes increasingly
important to have a clear focus on the limits of this tort.
The present state of case law reflects the legacy of William L.
Prosser, who classified the cases using the privacy rubric into
four categories: (1) intrusion into one's solitude or private af-
fairs ("intrusion"); (2) appropriation of a name or likeness for
commercial purposes ("appropriation"); (3) publicity which
places one in a false light ("false light"); and (4) public disclo-
* The authors gratefully acknowledge the contribution of Professor Christine L.
Whitman of the University of Michigan. Many of the ideas in this article originated
from or were inspired by her excellent seminar on Defamation and Privacy conducted
in the Spring of 1978 at the University of Michigan Law School.
** General Counsel, Cambridge. Venture Partners, a Colorado venture capital
fund which concentrates on investing in start-up computer, software and medical tech-
nology companies; formerly of Irell & Manella, Los Angeles, California, and of Cleary,
Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, New York, New York; J.D. magna cum laude, Michigan
Law School; Sc.B. with Honors, Brown University; Chairman, Proprietary Rights in
Software Committee, Computer Law Division, ABA Section of Science and Technol-
ogy. The author has written, taught and spoken on financing new computer ventures,
negotiating computer system procurements, protecting computer software, and other
issues relating to computer law.
*** Formerly a partner of Reish & Davis, Santa Monica, California. A.B. 1973 Smith
College; J.D. 1977, Rutgers University. The author has written and spoken on tax plan-
ning, trust formation and administration, community and joint tenancy forms of prop-
erty ownership, and other issues related to estate planning.
1. Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 198 (1890).
2. Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 233, 237 (1977).
3. In 1956 one federal judge evaluated the state of privacy case law as the
equivalent of a "haystack in a hurricane". Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting
Co., 229 F.2d 481, 485 (3d Cir. 1956) (Biggs, C.J.).
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sure of private facts ("public disclosure").4 Prosser's analysis
has been embodied in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
Prosser's classification has been criticized for departing from
the Warren and Brandeis formulation, that is, for failing to
unify and ennoble the rights into one central right to dignity or
right to be left alone,6 or into one right of peace of mind.7 Pros-
ser's analysis can also be criticized for lack of definition. Cer-
tain privacy situations are well-defined.8  Most privacy
situations under Prosser's definitions, however, have no well-
defined analogues. Instead, a jury is left to decide whether the
defendant's conduct was so "offensive" as to offend a reason-
able person's sense of what privacy should be protectable.9 In
some instances, Prosser's torts fail to provide any basis for
relief.' °
What is needed is a common method of analyzing the pri-
vacy situations, one which can be applied to the disparate pri-
vacy torts and to circumstances not covered by them, and
which can provide better guidance and definition for practi-
tioners, juries and courts. This article presents the develop-
ment and application of such a method, and demonstrates how
it can unify, broaden and strengthen the present schema of pri-
vacy torts.
I
The Developing Methodology
The developing method of analyzing privacy situations is ap-
plicable to situations in which private information is obtained
4. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 652A-I (1976). The Restatement has not
been adopted in all states, however, at least in whole. E.g., Davis v. First National
Bank of Arizona, 124 Ariz. 458, 462, 605 P.2d 37, 41 (1979); Kapellas v. Kaufman, 1 Cal. 3d
20, 35 n.16, 459 P.2d 912, 921 n.16, 81 Cal. Rptr. 360, 369 n.16 (1969); Hollander v. Lubow,
277 Md. 47, 53-60; 351 A.2d 421, 424-27 (1976); Wolfe v. Arroyo, 543 S.W.2d 11, 13 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1976).
6. See, e.g., Bloustein, Privacy As an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to
Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (1964). See generally Nizer, The Right of Privacy-
A Half Century's Developments, 39 MICH. L. REV. 526 (1941).
7. See, e.g., Wade, Defamation and the Right of Privacy, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1093
(1962).
8. E.g., intrusion cases are analogous to search and seizure cases, see infra note
30.
9. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 652B, D and E (1976).
10. E.g., Tureen v. Equifax, 571 F.2d 411 (8th Cir. 1978); see infra text accompany-
ing notes 37-39.
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or disclosed. Instead of analyzing such a privacy situation as
one involving "offensive" conduct by the defendant, the devel-
oping method analyzes the privacy situation as one in which
the defendant has exceeded the extent to which the plaintiff
has expressly or impliedly consented to the gathering or dis-
closure of the private information in question.
This approach to analyzing a privacy situation grants better
guidance to practitioners, juries, and judges. It is based upon
the concept of consent, which has well-defined legal prece-
dent.' Additional guidance is supplied, by analogy, to several
well-established areas of the law. Cases involving the gather-
ing of information without the consent of the plaintiff can be
analogized to search and seizure decisions under the fourth
amendment of the United States Constitution. To this extent,
the cases under Prosser's intrusion tort already have been ana-
lyzed under this scope of consent approach. 2 Intrusion, how-
ever, protects one from some but not all intrusions into areas
not dedicated to the public. 3 Under Prosser's construction,
the tort may not cover the situation in which a person exposes
private details for limited purposes only to another, who uses
the information for other purposes. 4 Under the construction
given intrusion by the concept of the scope of consent, that
misuse could be tortious. Plaintiffs, in such contexts, would
have a powerful means to protect many privacy interests here-
tofore unprotected by the intrusion tort and by the other pri-
vacy torts as well.
Cases involving the disclosure of private information which
was rightfully gathered, albeit for limited purposes, could be
analogized to trade secret and breach of confidence cases.
Trade secrets have many similarities to personal secrets. To
be protected, a trade secret must be deserving of protection.
Its owner must have taken steps to ensure its secrecy.' 5 Trade
secrets, however, often are valuable only if they can be li-
censed or disclosed for limited purposes. 16 In recent years, a
considerable body of law has developed regarding the extent to
11. Prosser, supra note 4, at 417-18. See also, Florida Publishing Co. v. Fletcher, 340
So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1976).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 113-17.
13.. Prosser, supra note 4, at 392-98.
14. Id. A strict analogy to fourth amendment cases also would tend to bring about
this result. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), infra note 108.
15. R. MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS § 2.03 (1982).
16. Id. at § 1.02.
No. 11
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which licensees, employees, contractors and others having
such limited access can be prevented from using or disclosing
the trade secrets without the consent of the trade secret own-
er. 7 Similarly, there is a considerable body of law respecting
breaches of confidence. 18 Typically, a confidential relationship
is created by contract or is implied by law because of the rela-
tionship between the parties involved,'9 and if the party en-
trusted in confidence with the sensitive information uses or
discloses it in violation of the express or implied confidential-
ity relationship, an action will lie preventing the disclosure or
permitting recovery of damages because of it.2" Thus, privacy
actions could arise in the context of existing relationships,
such as employer/employee, debtor/creditor or doctor/patient,
even if no action currently could be pursued under Prosser's
privacy torts. These analogies have the added advantage of be-
ing the method recognized by Warren and Brandeis for analyz-
ing privacy situations. They compared their right of privacy to
trade secret law, common law copyright (which covered the
improper appropriation of private papers), and breach of confi-
dence principles.2'
The breach of the scope of consent method of analysis has
been recognized and applied in several recent decisions. It is
best illustrated by Dietemann v. Time, Inc.,22 in which report-
ers investigating an alleged "quack" doctor entered his home
(and office) with permission, but had hidden on their persons
microphones and cameras. The court held this to be an inva-
sion of privacy because
[while] [o]ne who invites another to his home or office takes a
risk... that the visitor may repeat all he hears and observes
to others . . . he does not and should not be required to take
the risk that what is heard and seen will be transmitted by pho-
17. Id. at § 7.08(1).
18. E.g., Dietemann v. Time, 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Warren and Brandeis, supra note 1, at 212-14. Common law copyright, until the
1976 Copyright Act, gave one the right to keep letters, writings and statements unpub-
lished, and to get back or enjoin publication of any of the above which is lost or stolen
to others. Id. at 119-207. Breach of confidence or implied contract allowed parties to
make limited disclosures without losing the information to the public as a whole. Id. at
207-12. Trade secret law allowed companies to bind employees to secrecy and to enjoin
those other companies who get the information surreptitiously, through spying, bur-
glary or bribery. Id. at 212-14.
22. 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
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tograph or recording... to the public at large or to any seg-
ment of it that the visitor may select.23
In this one statement, the court applied the scope of consent
method of analysis. The gathering of information in the plain-
tiff's home had been permitted by express consent. The re-
peating of what was seen and heard to others was also
permitted, by implied consent. This implied consent did not
extend, however, to the electronic recording and photograph-
ing of the plaintiff. The appropriate analysis for a juror
presented with a similar factual circumstance would not be
whether the electronic recording and transmitting were "offen-
sive", but whether the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of
privacy with respect to actions a visitor might take when in-
vited to the plaintiff's home or office.24 Common sense would
inform the juror that a person must expect a visitor to repeat
what is seen and heard but ordinarily would not expect the
repetition to be by electronic recording and. broadcasting
transmittal.
A. Intrusion of the Home
Following Dietemann v. Time, a series of decisions have in-
corporated similar reasoning, although often without recogniz-
ing the connections between their analyses and the analysis by
the Ninth Circuit in that case. Some of the clearest and easiest
issues to handle arose, like the issue in Dietemann v. Time, in
the context of the gathering of information at the plaintiffs
home. When the invasion of privacy and the gathering of infor-
mation occur in a context in which consent could not reason-
ably be implied, the courts should have little difficulty under
Prosser's analysis in determining that an invasion of privacy
has occurred. In other circumstances, however, the courts
have applied the developing method of analysis.
Difficult cases have arisen when the invasion into the home
was under a limited implied or express consent. In Florida
23. Id. at 249. Warren and Brandeis presaged this concept when they constructed
their right of privacy in analogy to breach of confidentiality, inter alia. See supra note
21.
24. The "reasonable expectation of privacy" test has been applied in search and
seizure cases under the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution and is
appropriate here. See Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Note, A Reconsideration of the
Katz Expectation of Privacy Test, 76 MIcH. L. REV. 154 (1977). See generally infra text
accompanying note 101.
No. 11
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Publishing Co. v. Fletcher,25 a newspaper had published a pic-
ture of a silhouette of the plaintiff's daughter, who had died in
a fire at her home. The court found that there was implied con-
sent by custom that, when a fire had occurred, a photographer
could enter with the fire marshall who was investigating the
cause of the fire to photograph pertinent details. In this case,
the photograph was taken for the official investigation by a
newspaper photographer, and was later published in his news-
paper. In a close decision, which reversed an equally close de-
cision of the appellate court, the Florida Supreme Court held
that, because of the implied consent, the "trespass" was not
actionable. 26 In Rafferty v. Hartford Courant Co .,27 defendant's
news photographers and one of its reporters, none of whom
were invited, attended a mock "unwedding" ceremony at a pri-
vate location where plaintiffs were celebrating their recent di-
vorces. The court held that the public's "right to find out"
about private acts of individuals is not absolute, and, in the ab-
sence of consent, the publication of these private events could
be tortious.28
B. Privacy Arising from Existing Relationships
Often the investigations of persons at their homes occur in
connection with some relationship between the plaintiff and
defendant, where the defendant is in the position to argue that,
because of the relationship, there was implied, or even ex-
press, consent for the investigation. Courts have faced this ar-
gument when considering the issue of the extent to which a
person claiming a disability or injury in a workers' compensa-
tion or personal injury case has consented to an investigation.
Generally, seeking benefits has been sufficient to provide con-
sent to the use of movies or videotapes, even with telephoto
lenses, showing the movements of the plaintiff.29 In contrast,
telephone companies have been found liable for invasions of
privacy if their employees enter customers' homes, even
25. 340 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1976).
26. The court did not reach the issue of whether the scope of implied consent ex-
tended to the publication. If the photograph had been part of the public record per-
haps no invasion of privacy action could have been asserted.
27. 36 Conn. Supp. 239, 416 A.2d 1215 (1980).
28. Id. at 241, 416 A.2d at 1216.
29. E.g., American Electric Co-Operative, Inc. v. Partridge, 284 Ala. 442, 225 So. 2d
848 (1969); McLain v. Boise Cascade Corp., 271 Or. 549, 533 P.2d 343 (1975); and Jeffers v.
City of Seattle, 23 Wash. App. 301, 597 P.2d 899 (1979).
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though empty at the time, to repossess telephones used by cus-
tomers who are delinquent in paying their bills,30 and despite
any claim of right, in the form of a tariff, by the local telephone
regulatory body approving such action.3 Landlords have also
asserted the right to enter premises to impound possessions in
order to enforce the delinquent payment of rent. In Lucas v.
Ludwig ,32 after the landlord had impounded the tenant's pos-
sessions, the tenant accompanied by police officers entered the
landlord's home to try to repossess his property on charges of
theft. The presence of the police did not make the intrusion
any more legitimate. The court held that the tenant, by caus-
ing the unwarranted police visit and involvement, seriously in-
terfered with the plaintiff's interest in not having her affairs
known to others, including the police, and went beyond any
privilege or implied consent the tenant may have had to enter
the premises. 33
It is fairly clear how the developing methodology works in
the case of an intrusion of the home, with or without any rela-
tionship between the intruder and the homeowner. The diffi-
cult problems arise when the invasion of privacy violates
interests in other contexts, such as those arising in connection
with a relationship between the parties. Prosser's analysis
fails to provide an adequate balance of the competing interests.
Under Prosser's analysis, the basis for distinguishing between
information disclosed for limited purposes and information
dedicated to the public is in the concept of "publication. ' 34 This
concept is fraught with difficulties, particularly because it is a
concept originally designed for copyright or defamation situa-
tions and not for privacy cases. The scope of consent analysis
of Dietemann v. Time, 5 on the other hand, provides much
broader and more satisfactory results in many of these privacy
situations.
C. Information Data Banks and Reporting
Analyzing privacy cases using the scope of consent concept
30. Gonzales v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 555 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. 1977).
31. Engman v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 591 S.W.2d 78 (Mo. App. 1979).
32. 313 So. 2d 12 (La. App. 1975).
33. Id. at 15.
34. Prosser, supra note 4, at 393-94. See, e.g., Tureen v. Equifax, Inc., 571 F.2d 411
(8th Cir. 1978); Beaumont v. Brown, 401 Mich. 80, 257 N.W.2d 522 (1977); Porten v. Uni-
versity of San Francisco, 64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1976).
35. Dietemann, supra note 22.
No. 11
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could have a tremendous impact on problems related to the re-
tention and reporting of information, particularly in connection
with computer data banks, which have the greatest opportu-
nity for pervasive privacy invasion today. A consequence of
our technologically complex society is that computer data
banks often hold extremely private details of one's personal
history. From salary to marital status, financial net worth to
personal references, too much information is available to those
who can simply punch in the proper code, with little restraint
on how this information may be used. Using the developing
methodology could give one the right to limit the dissemina-
tion of information. For example, information obtained for the
purpose of evaluating credit could be restricted to that specific
purpose. Because the consent is limited, the creditor could not
disclose the information to another, sell names for a mailing
list, or otherwise compromise the scope of this consent. In the
same sense, if a person tells a reporter that the conversation is
"off the record," that person would now have the means to en-
sure that result.3 6 Thus, to use private information in an alter-
nate manner, one must either obtain consent for each specific
use or a blanket waiver of consent. Of course, there will be
situations where little choice exists regarding consent because
of unequal bargaining power. In such cases, the better ap-
proach is to look to the legislature to shape protective policy.
For the majority of cases, however, one need not go so far; this
principle will be sufficient.
The deficiencies of Prosser's approach in analyzing the limits
of a data-reporting company's right to disseminate is illus-
trated by Tureen v. Equifax, Inc 7.3  The Eighth Circuit held
that investigations by a health insurance company following a
claim of disability by the plaintiff were not actionable, in part
because the plaintiff had specifically checked a box for a "spe-
cial health" investigation when making his claim. The plaintiff
made an additional argument that, even if the conducting of
36. A person discussing issues with the press, however, assumes the risk that the
resulting story will not comport with the person's wishes. See, e.g., Goldman v. Time,
Inc., 336 F. Supp. 133 (N.D. Cal. 1971), discussed infra at note 65. Enforcing confidenti-
ality of private information requires protection in varying degrees. However, this pro-
tection "must be able to withstand many forceful arguments of constitutional
principles and policy available not only to a free press, but also to a free people." Ger-
ety, supra note 2 at 283. The balancing of these interests gives us the final test for the
constitutionality of this concept of privacy. Id.
37. 571 F.2d 411 (8th Cir. 1978).
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the initial investigation was within his consent, the retention of
the resulting report was not.38 The court held that the defend-
ant had a privilege to retain the information because of a legiti-
mate business need for retention of such reports to minimize
the risk of extending valuable benefits and credit to persons
submitting fraudulent claims and credit applications. On these
two issues the court applied a scope of consent analysis.
The plaintiff also argued that the later disclosure of this in-
formation to other parties was an invasion of his privacy. The
court, apparently hampered by the limitations of Prosser's
classifications, found that such disclosure was neither covered
by the intrusion tort nor involved a "publication" which would
bring it under the public disclosure tort.39 The dissent dis-
agreed as to this latter holding,' noting that basing the deci-
sion upon the narrow, artificial question of whether a
publication had occurred would not adequately consider the
plaintiff's privacy interest; the plaintiff could be losing control
over the dissemination of information about himself regardless
of the occurrence of a "publication."'"
Similarly, the limitations of Prosser's four privacy torts
"handcuffed" the Ohio courts in Shibley v. Time, Inc.' The
plaintiff brought a class action for subscribers to publications
and holders of credit cards, claiming that the practice of pub-
lishers and credit card companies of disclosing the names, ad-
dresses and other information of their subscribers and credit
card holders was an invasion of privacy. The court held that
such an invasion of privacy claim was not maintainable be-
cause it did not fit under any of the four privacy torts of Pros-
ser. The court found that no intrusion had occurred despite
some dissemination of this information. 3 On appeal, the court
held that an actionable invasion of privacy would require the
unwarranted appropriation or exploitation of plaintiff's person-
ality and that because no endorsement of any products or serv-
ices had occurred in the dissemination of names, there had
been no tortious appropriation." While there may be implied
38. Id. at 416.
39. Id. at 419.
40. Id. at 420.
41. Id. at 422.
42. 40 Ohio Misc. 51, 55, 321 N.E.2d 791, 794 (1974), affd 45 Ohio App. 2d 69, 72, 341
N.E.2d 337, 339 (1975).
43. Id. at 57, 321 N.E.2d at 795.
44. .45 Ohio App. 2d at 72, 341 N.E.2d at 339.
No. 11
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consent by custom in this circumstance, because of the wide-
spread knowledge that such customer lists are sometimes as-
signed to third parties, the present schema of Prosser's torts
does not allow serious consideration of this issue in a tort
context.
45
In contrast is the reasoning of the court in Fadjo v. Coon,46
involving an investigation of a beneficiary of life insurance pol-
icies. An action for violation of a constitutional right of privacy
was held to be proper when information the plaintiff had given
an investigator for the state, under a pledge of confidentiality,
was released by the state to a private insurance investigator. 7
The court, not hampered by Prosser's torts, rather than phras-
ing the issue as one of publication, phrased the issue in terms
of breach of a confidentiality agreement and balanced the
plaintiff's privacy interest against any legitimate state
interest.4 8
D. The Press
The press 49 is another major institution in society wielding
great power over privacy. The press (as it did in Dietemann v.
Time) can raise a constitutional objection to this developing
method of analyzing privacy torts: the gathering of information
is as essential to a free press as the publishing of that informa-
tion; by granting an injunction for publication of material gath-
ered by modern technological methods, the court infringes
upon the first amendment of the United States Constitution.
This argument, however, is unpersuasive for several reasons.
First, allowing the press full freedom to "snoop" in the home or
in files dedicated for limited purposes could greatly reduce the
most important areas of privacy of individuals. Since the con-
stitutional dimension of the right to privacy has long been rec-
ognized,"° the competing interests here must be balanced.
Second, this argument assumes that under the first amend-
45. The giving of names alone may not be an invasion of privacy as there must be
an objectionable public disclosure of private facts. See Hollander v. Lubow, 277 Md. 47,
55, 351 A.2d 421, 425 (1976).
46. 633 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1981).
47. Id. at 1175.
48. Id. at 1176.
49. This article will use the term "the press" to refer to major organized news gath-
ering and disseminating institutions.
50. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see also Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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ment, the press has greater rights in gathering information
than individuals. The Supreme Court, however, has rejected
granting the press, as an institution, such greater rights.51 Al-
though the text of the amendment refers both to freedom of
speech and to freedom of the press, the founders' probable in-
tention was to distinguish between speaking and writing, simi-
lar to the distinction made between slander and libel, and not
to distinguish between the institutional press and informal or
non-commercial publishers.5 2 Certainly the difficulty of deter-
mining when publishers or broadcasters have become part of
the press seems insurmountable.5 3
Barber v. Time, Inc."Y provides a good example of how the
developing methodology establishes limits on invasions of pri-
vacy by the press. In this case, the plaintiff suffered from a
medical disorder which gave her an insatiable appetite, yet left
her malnourished. Two photographers took pictures of her in
her hospital bed, despite her protests, and subsequently used
them to illustrate their news article. Their unauthorized action
was held to be tortious.55 Under the scope of consent analysis,
the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of freedom from pho-
tographers while a patient in the hospital; her claim, therefore,
was properly upheld. Of course, if the pictures were taken as
the plaintiff entered the hospital, the result might have been
different. She would have had less of a claim against the press
because in public her expectation of privacy would have been
less. In a similar vein, because of obligations arising from the
relationship between a physician and a patient, a hospital
probably would not be able to divulge to the press the name
and the illness of a patient without the patient's consent.56
In circumstances such as these, the press often argues that
the plaintiff loses her right of privacy because her illness is
newsworthy. 7 The freedom of the press to print her name and
51. Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 16 (1978); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834
(1974); Saxbe v. Washington Post, 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974) (giving a reporter no more
right of access to prisons or inmates than is given an ordinary citizen).
52. Christie, Injury to Reputation and the Constitution: Confusion Amid Conflict-
ing Approaches, 75 MICH. L. REV. 43, 57-58 (1976-1977).
53. Id. at 58.
54. 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942).
55. Id. at 295. See also Estate of Berthiaume v. Pratt, 365 A.2d 792 (Me. 1976) (in-
trusion by taking unauthorized picture of dying man).
56. The disclosure of a patient's name alone is not a violation of a patient's rights.
See Geisberger v. Willuhn, 72 Ill. App. 3d 435, 390 N.E.2d 945 (1979).
57. E.g., Rafferty v. Hartford Courant Co., 36 Conn. Supp. 239, 416 A.2d 1215 (1980).
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the personal details of her life, rather than simply to discuss
the illness of an anonymous person, turns on this question. By
applying the scope of consent analysis, one need never tread
upon the "slippery slope" of newsworthiness. If the reporters
have to approach her for the information, and she refuses to
give it or to have her picture taken in the privacy of the hospi-
tal, or if she gives it with the limitation that her name and
background not be mentioned, the reporters are limited ac-
cordingly. If they gather the information properly, without vio-
lating an area in which she has a reasonable expectation of
privacy, they are not restricted. In effect, if "newsworthiness"
is defined as the boundary between properly and improperly
gathered information, the courts need never restrict the con-
tent of news according to its subject matter; they need look
-- only at the manner of discovery, the extent to which the plain-
tiff has dedicated the information to the public domain, and
whether she had a reasonable expectation of privacy as to its
discovery.
Similarly, this analysis would have better resolved the issues
in United States v. Progressive, Inc.,58 another case involving
the press. The Progressive attempted to print an article on the
inconsistencies in the government's classification of secrets;
the article revealed the "secret" of thermonuclear devices (hy-
drogen bombs). The U.S. Government argued that to reveal
the contents of the article would breach national security and
its publication should therefore be enjoined. The magazine as-
serted that the article only included information obtained from
the public domain, and that its consolidation into one article
was protected under the first amendment. The government
disputed this contention, asserting that the article contained a
core of information which the government had never dedicated
to the public domain. Under the scope of consent analysis, this
factual determination would have been dispositive; if the court
had followed that analysis, no "prior restraint" 9 would have
occurred, as the court could have answered the factual issue
without looking into the content of the article.6 °
58. 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979).
59. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715-16 (1931); see also Nebraska Press
Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 601 n.27 (1976).
60. A determination may have to be made as to whether the information was the
sort which could be private, but the determination could be made under protective
order and would not be the basis for an injunction. In a trade secret case, the informa-
[Vol. 6
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The press still has a broad privilege under the analysis used.
If a publisher or broadcaster receives the information without
instigating or encouraging the invasion of privacy, it is free to
publish.6' Although this distinction somewhat limits the scope
of the tort, it seems a sensible balance. The press has a fairly
clear guideline with which to work.62 In those cases where an
embarrassing private fact is surreptitiously gained and re-
leased to the unsuspecting reporter, one suspects it would not
be published absent some newsworthy aspect. As a public pol-
icy, the public may be willing to suffer some gossip to avoid
another Watergate. Arguably, in the realm of government in-
formation, inadvertent disclosures are not protectable under
the privacy tort. The right of privacy belongs to individuals or
private associations.63 Congress has thoroughly preempted the
field with various federal privacy acts.64 Thus, the press can
still fairly freely perform its function of being a check on gov-
ernment. Of course, a public official would still have a cause of
action when the publication involved information improperly
obtained from his home or elsewhere about those few aspects
of his life not dedicated to the public.65
The privilege of the press would also extend to situations
where the plaintiff consents to a disclosure or an investigation
for certain purposes and the resulting article or news broad-
cast characterizes the discovered information in a manner dif-
ferent from that expected. Targets of investigations could
control what is revealed, not how it is characterized or inte-
grated with other rightfully obtained facts. In Goldman v.
tion must be determined to be a trade secret, but the basis of any remedy is the wrong-
ful act of the defendant. MILGRIM, supra note 15, at § 7.08[2] n.45.
61. Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701, 706 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947
(1969).
62. Cf R. MILGRIM, supra note 15, at § 5.04[21 (right of person who acquires knowl-
edge of a trade secret without any reason to believe it is secret, to use it).
63. Socialist Workers Party v. United States, 463 F. Supp. 515, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
64. See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982) (requires that an individual
be given access to government records concerning the individual and prevents these
records from being made public without his or her consent); Right to Financial Privacy
Act of 1978 § 1101-22, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-22 (1982) (prohibits governmental access to cus-
tomer records prepared by financial institutions, except in certain limited situations);
20 U.S.C. §§ 1232f-32i (1982) (withholding funds from educational institutions that deny
parents and students access to student records or that release such records without
the consent of the students' parents).
65. In Shewmaker v. Minchew, 504 F. Supp. 156, 163-64 (D.D.C. 1980), the court
noted that a public official has no reasonable expectation of privacy as to his conduct
while in the employ of the government.
No. 11
COMM/ENT L. J.
Time, Inc.,66 for example, the plaintiffs, young Americans living
in caves in a village on the island of Crete, sued Time for inva-
sion of privacy because of an article written by a reporter who
had investigated the plaintiffs with their consent. The plain-
tiffs contended that they cooperated with and consented to
photographs and questioning under the impression that the ar-
ticle was to be in the form of a travelogue. Instead, the article's
theme was disenchanted American youth, and the plaintiffs
were portrayed as aimless wanderers seeking refuge from
America. The court held, in analogy to the privilege granted
the press for publication of defamatory information, that Time
was privileged in publishing this article because "a great deal
of latitude must necessarily be afforded the media in its selec-
tion and presentation of news."67
The press would still be limited, however, in how far it could
go in characterizing or using the information it obtains. This is
so, even in circumstances where the person is otherwise ex-
posed to public scrutiny. For example, close surveillance of a
person in a public place, such as a bank, does not violate his
right of privacy as long as his actions reveal to any casual ob-
server the later-reported information, such as the amount of
money withdrawn.68 If consent cannot be implied from his ac-
tions, however, close surveillance can become actionable as an
overzealous intrusion.69 But while an embarrassing photo-
graph may be taken in a public place because consent to be
seen is implied, mere public presence may not itself constitute
consent for the subsequent publication of such a photograph,
for the consent to be seen did not extend that far.7 ° On the
other hand, when filmmaking is done from a public place, and
the subject of the investigation is involved in a newsworthy
event, it can be expected that broad protection will be given to
the press. 71
66. 336 F. Supp. 133 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
67. Id. at 138.
68. Nader v. General Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560, 567, 570, 307 N.Y.S.2d 647, 653, 655,
255 N.E.2d 765, 769, 771 (1970).
69. Id. at 570, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 655, 255 N.E.2d at 771.
70. See Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 276 Ala. 380, 162 So. 2d 474 (1964) (a
woman whose dress was blown upward in a fun house has an actionable claim for
intrusion where a photograph thereof is published); but see, Neff v. Time, Inc., 406 F.
Supp. 858 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (where plaintiff was in a group at football game that en-
couraged and persuaded him to pose for photographer, publication of his picture with
his pants zipper open is not actionable in privacy).
71. Mark v. King Broadcasting Co., 27 Wash. App. 344, 618 P.2d 512 (1980) (no inva-
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E. Disclosures of Intimate Personal Attributes
The scope of consent concept is also useful in analyzing situ-
ations of limited disclosure of highly intimate matters, both
physical and mental, in the context of a relationship between
the plaintiff and defendant (lawyer, doctor, clergyman, banker,
etc.). As almost every aspect of life increasingly demands ex-
posure of one's private affairs, it seems not merely a useful, but
a necessary, standard for balancing these interests properly.
Many cases fall within some general medical context. In De
May v. Roberts,72 a layman accompanied the doctor into a room
where Mrs. Roberts was in labor and about to give birth to a
child. The court held that the layman entered the room under
false pretenses. The fraud was imputed to Dr. De May because
he failed to tell Mr. and Mrs. Roberts that Scattergood, the lay-
man, was not medically trained. The Roberts' tacit consent
was based on their false assumption of Scattergood's medical
status, and therefore was inoperative. The court termed child-
birth as a "most sacred" occasion, during which Mrs. Roberts
had a "legal right to" . . . "privacy."73 Another case, York v.
Story,74 presents an analogous situation involving intimate
physical exposure. In York, a policeman told a young woman,
the victim of a recent crime, that, despite her objection, he was
required to photograph her bruises in order to preserve evi-
dence of the crime. She ultimately consented because of his
misrepresentations. The nude photographs were later repro-
duced and widely distributed throughout the police
department.75
It is the characterization of these two cases as invasions of
privacy that presents the focal issue. The scope of consent
analysis allows a court the opportunity to balance the issues
involved and better assess the extent of damages. For in-
stance, when a newspaper publishes a picture of a deformed
sion of privacy when television crew took photograph, in conjunction with a legitimate
news story, through the open front window of plaintiff's office).
72. 46 Mich. 160, 9 N.W. 146 (1881). See also, Knight v. Penobscot Bay Medical
Center, 420 A.2d 915 (Me. 1980) (no liability due to lack of scienter where nurse's hus-
band, who consented to viewing of one birth, unintentionally was shown a different
birth).
73. Id. at 165, 9 N.W. at 149.
74. 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 939 (1964).
75. While this case was brought under the constitutional right of privacy through
the 1871 Civil Rights Act, it provides useful precedent by analogy.
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newborn child,v6 the child's parents are not disturbed about
possible reputation loss as much they are chagrined that the
world is an intimate bystander to their private tragedy."7 The
developing analysis is better designed to measure damages for
turning such a private moment into a public event, by concen-
trating on the manner in which the photograph became avail-
able to the newspaper and the extent to which the plaintiffs
tried to preserve their privacy, rather than considering the of-
fensiveness of the publication.
The privacy right encompasses exposure not only of physical
characteristics, but also of mental characteristics. In Doe v.
Roe,7 8 a psychiatrist's former patient sued to enjoin publica-
tion of a medical book containing a detailed case history and
verbatim disclosures from therapy. Although the court did not
recognize a common law right of privacy in New York, it up-
held the claim based on the implied contract of confidentiality
in a professional relationship and on statutory medical regula-
tions.7 9  The court specifically did not reach the issue of the
psychiatrist's right to publish case histories where identities
are fully concealed.8" Both the privacy interests of the patient
and the public interest in medical research and discovery can
be served by disguising the identity of the patient. Even if a
technical breach of contract were present, there would be no
liability because causation of injury could not be shown. Thus,
the breach of confidentiality analysis in the context of these
types of privacy interests is well-suited for evaluating broader
policy questions.81
76. E.g., Bazemore v. Savannah Hosp., 171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194 (1930).
77. Bloustein, supra note 6, at 979.
78. 93 Misc. 2d 201, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668 (1977).
79. Id. at 212-13, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 676.
80. Id. at 214, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 677.
81. The more difficult extension of these invasions of privacy is presented by Com-
monwealth v. Wiseman, 356 Mass. 251, 249 N.E.2d 610 (1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 960
(1970), which involved a film of inmates of a state correctional institution. The film was
described as a
stark portrayal of patient-routine and treatment of the inmates [which] is at
once a scathing indictment of the inhumane conditions that prevailed at the
time of the film and an undeniable infringement of the privacy of the inmates
filmed, who are shown nude and engaged in acts that would unquestionably
embarrass an individual of normal sensitivity.
398 U.S. at 960 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The State of Massachusetts sued to enjoin any
showing of this film on the ground that proper releases were not obtained from all
persons identifiable in the film. The defendants argued that the ifim was invaluable
not merely for education, but also for its bearing on the important public issue of
mental health care. The court, sensitive both to the privacy and public policy interests,
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F. Debtor/Creditor
Another common situation in which privacy interests can be
invaded occurs when plaintiff and defendant are debtor and
creditor. Many states have faced the issue of the extent to
which a creditor can attempt to enforce a debt. Often the
measures taken do not involve the communication of informa-
tion or the gathering of information, and thus are not appropri-
ately analyzed by the developing method of analysis. When
the creditor is simply attempting to harass the debtor, the
proper tort for relief and for balancing the conflicting issues
involved is the tort of intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress.8 2 Many creditor cases, however, are well-analyzed by the
developing methodology. Some creditor cases involve investi-
gations of the debtor as a first step in deciding whether to take
further action against him.83 These cases involve issues simi-
lar to those raised by investigations prompted by personal in-
jury or diability claims.84 Similarly, other creditor cases
involve the dissemination of information and credit histories of
delinquent debtors. These cases could be analyzed in the
same manner as the investigation cases. In entering a debtor/
creditor relation, the debtor has dedicated certain private in-
formation to the creditor's use. The limits of the creditor's use
of the information depend on the legitimate business needs of
the creditor, which should be analyzed in the context of the
debtor/creditor relationship. The developing method of analy-
sis would work well in this context. The public policy ex-
pressed by the legitimate business needs of the creditor
circumscribes both implied consent and the debtor's reason-
able expectations of privacy.
The most common issue arising in these cases stems from
the creditor's publication or display of the name or likeness of
a debtor and the fact of the debtor's delinquency. The courts
have generally attempted to handle this issue under the public
disclosure tort, since neither defamation nor false light are ap-
allowed the presentation of the film only to appropriate audiences for its legal or medi-
cal value. The significance of this case to the developing method of analysis lies both
in the novel relief granted and in the breach of consent analysis used by the court to
find liability.
82. See infra text accompanying notes 109-112. See Munley v. ISC Financial
House, Inc., 584 P.2d 1336 (Okla. 1978).
83. See Vogel v. W. T. Grant Co., 458 Pa. 124, 327 A.2d 133 (1974) (good analysis of
creditor cases).
84. See supra text accompanying note 36.
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propriate if the creditor was astute enough to avoid the impli-
cation of falsehood.85 Generally, the issue is framed as
whether the disclosure was a "publication," that is, whether
the disclosure was made to the public at large or to so many
persons that it can be inferred that the information would soon
become public knowledge. 6 Viewed in the context of the de-
veloping method of analysis, this may not provide satisfactory
results in the long run. The creditor's self-help rights should
not be judged in the context of an artificial standard such as
"publication," or a vague standard such as "offensiveness," but
should instead be judged by a standard which balances the re-
spective interests involved with the extent to which the debtor
has, by entering into the debt, consented to certain self-help
remedies. 7
G. Employer/Employee
Privacy issues also arise in the context of employment.
Based on the developing method of analysis, the privacy inter-
est of the employee would be protected depending on the du-
ties and obligations of the employer with respect to
information about the employee. Currently, none of the pri-
vacy torts suggested by Prosser adequately balances these is-
sues. In Beaumont v. Brown,88 the employer, the Department
of Labor, wrote a lengthy letter to the Army Reserve request-
ing confirmation of the plaintiff's military schedule as well as
information concerning military procedures for reservists. The
plaintiff had apparently left his job for a month without ap-
proval or notification to his supervisor in order to attend a re-
serve training session. The court held that there was sufficient
evidence to present an invasion of privacy action to a jury be-
cause the letter went too far in describing the plaintiff's bad
85. Vogel v. W. T. Grant Co., 458 Pa. 124, 327 A.2d 133 (1974); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS, § 652D Comment d (1977).
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652D, Comment d (1977).
87. In this context, cases applying the developing method of analysis may agree
with cases which hold that publication of loan delinquency to the public at large in an
attempt to embarrass or cajole the debtor into payment is, on balance, not sufficient to
outweigh the debtor's reputation and privacy interests, especially since creditors have
alternate means of self-help and access to legal means of redress. Cf. Norris v. King,
355 So. 2d 21 (La. 1978) (erecting a billboard with plaintiffs photographs and captions
indicating he was a convicted thief in an effort to coerce repayment held to be an inva-
sion of privacy, although truthful, because defendant could have pursued legal means
of redress).
88. 401 Mich. 80, 257 N.W.2d 522 (1977).
[Vol. 6
ANALYZING PRIVACY TORTS
employment record to the Army Reserve.89 Under the develop-
ing method of analysis, the issues in that case would have been
characterized as duties of the employer to retain the confiden-
tiality of information regarding an employee. The court, how-
ever, disavowed any breach of confidence theory in analyzing
the issues and instead attempted to evaluate a summary judg-
ment motion on the issue of publication. The court went to
some length to determine that more people than simply the ad-
dressee of the letter would read the letter (that is, that it would
circulate throughout the Army's bureaucracy) and that there-
fore a "publication" had occurred.
The court further concluded that "publication" would de-
pend on the significance of the communication and that disclo-
sure to a small number of people might be deemed publication,
depending on the importance of the matter disclosed to the
persons made aware of it. 9° The court attempted to introduce
normative concepts of an employee's reasonable expectation
of privacy into the disparate concept of "publication." A more
appropriate analysis would be to remove the issue of "publica-
tion" and analyze the issue in terms of an employer's duties,
an employee's expectations, and society's legitimate
concerns.
91
H. Educational Records
Privacy issues also arise with respect to information regard-
ing a student's financial information and grades. In Porten v.
University of San Francisco,92 a student claimed misconduct
by the University in disclosing grades the student had earned
at another school. The student maintained that he had sought
and received assurances from the university that his prior
grades would be used only for evaluating his application for
admission. On appeal of a demurrer, the California court held
that there was no "publication" because the grades had only
been communicated to the California Scholarship and Loan
Commission and not to the general public. However, the court
went on to recognize that, because of a privacy provision added
89. Id. at 96, 257 N.W.2d at 528.
90. Id. at 105, 257 N.W.2d at 530-31.
91. See Rogers v. I.B.M. Corp., 500 F. Supp. 867, 870 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (company's
investigation of employee's job performance does not violate his right to privacy when
limited to discussions with and disclosures to company employees and to inspection of
company records).
92. 64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1976).
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to the California Constitution in 1972, 93 the plaintiff may have
stated a cause of action for breach of a confidential relation in a
context outside of Prosser's classification of privacy torts. This
is precisely the manner in which the developing method of
analysis would be applied-whether and to what extent a limi-
tation on the use of grades in the context of a student/univer-
sity relationship is understood or agreed to. This case
indicates, even in the absence of the California constitutional
privacy right, that relief is possible outside of Prosser's classifi-
cations by analyzing a dispute with reference to the relation-
ship between the parties, and by pursuing a cause of action
based on breach of implied or express obligations arising in
such a relationship. The fact that privacy interests are being
protected should not obscure the source of relief and should
not "strait-jacket" practitioners and courts into applying the
four torts of Prosser.
II
Application of the Developing Method to
Prosser's Four Privacy Torts
As has been demonstrated, the developing method of analy-
sis can be applied to fact patterns now falling within Prosser's
four privacy torts, as well as to those in which the four privacy
torts do not apply to the issues involved. In addition, many of
the doctrinal problems with the privacy torts can be obviated
by use of this method. Prosser's four privacy torts each suffer
certain doctrinal and theoretical inconsistencies. The intru-
sion tort is an amalgam of two concepts: prying for information
and disturbing solitude. 4 The appropriation tort has been rec-
ognized as primarily benefitting celebrities and indeed appears
to be developing into a "right of publicity."95 The false light
tort has been viewed as similar to defamation 96 and therefore
has not been recognized as a separate tort in some jurisdic-
tions.9 The public disclosure tort restricts publication of true
93. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 provides: "All people are by nature free and independent
and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty,
acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety,
happiness, and privacy."
94. See infra text accompanying note 103.
95. See infra text accompanying note 122.
96. See infra text accompanying note 188.
97. See infra notes 192-3.
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facts, and may be unconstitutional. 8 By properly applying the
developing method of analysis, however, many of the interests
which these torts are designed to address can be adequately
covered without some of the problems found in the present
definitions of these torts.
A. Intrusion
Prosser describes this tort as any "[i]ntrusion upon the
plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs."9 9 Of
the four torts, this is the one most deserving of the term "pri-
vacy"; in the others, an action will lie simply for the use of in-
formation gathered (or created) in the public domain. 0 This
intrusion tort most directly protects the right to be left alone.10'
It is further distinguished from the other torts because it does
not require publication. The tort is well-defined, with the gra-
vamen of an intrusion being the entering of physical space
where the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy,10 2
and from which the plaintiff could reasonably expect to ex-
clude intruders.0 3
Under Prosser's definition, the intrusion tort serves two dis-
tinct interests: protection from disturbances of solitude as well
as from prying. Thus, it would cover both harrassing a home-
owner with telephone calls and "bugging" a home with tele-
phone taps. This dual coverage may be a reflection of the tort's
doctrinal background, derived from both nuisance and tres-
pass law."0 4 The harassment or non-information-gathering as-
pect of intrusion, however, is not as well-defined as the prying
aspect. Also, other torts have developed to meet these particu-
lar problems. For example, offensive intrusions such as late
night phone calls may be covered by the tort of intentional in-
98. See infra text accompanying note 253.
99. Prosser, supra note 4, at 389.
100. See generally Konvitz, Privacy and the Law: A Philosophical Prelude, 31 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 272, 279 (1966).
101. In Cooley's treatise on torts, the right to be left alone preceded the right of
privacy, even though Warren and Brandeis receive the credit. COOLEY, TORTS 29 (2d
ed. 1888).
102. This test is borrowed from the fourth amendment, Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347
(1967). See, e.g., Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947
(1969) (applying the Katz standard to an intrusion action).
103. Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971).
104. EZER, INTRUSION ON SOLITUDE: HEREIN OF CivIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL WRONGS, LAW
IN TRANSITION 21, 63 (1961).
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fliction of mental distress. °5 Other intrusions of the home,
which are not meant to offend but nevertheless do, fall under
nuisance law or even trespass law.1 6 The earlier torts already
provide sufficient remedies for these issues and are better
designed to handle them. Disturbances which happen to in-
trude are often incidental to another person's enjoyment of
land. Nuisance law gives better protection to all interests than
does intrusion for these incidental disturbances at home; it
frames the issues in terms of balancing the equities between
competing land users, 0 7 permits recovery for negligence, and
allows equitable remedies. 0 8 Intrusion, however, frames the
issue as "offensiveness," is primarily an intentional tort, and
looks to damages as its basic relief. 0 By looking only at "of-
fensiveness," and not at the competing uses, intrusion would
tend to help undeserving plaintiffs, and by covering only inten-
tional disturbances, would tend to ignore deserving plaintiffs.
Disturbances of solitude may be intentional, as in the case of
harassment. Although the mental distress tort gives one less
protection from harassment than does intrusion, this result
may be desirable. By its careful restriction of protection, the
mental distress tort balances the normative and individual val-
ues of privacy; it has been narrowly defined precisely to avoid
trivialization of the right of privacy." 0 Privacy, like other
rights, is not absolute."' Outside the home, especially, it loses
105. When Prosser presented his original analysis, it was only in Ohio, which recog-
nizes no mental distress tort, that these cases had been lumped together as intrusion
cases. Prosser, supra note 4, at 390. The leading case is Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35,
133 N.E.2d 340 (1956). See Kelly v. Franco, 72 Ill. App. 3d 642, 28 Ill. Dec. 855, 391 N.E.2d
54 (1979) (held no intrusion) for a more recent analysis.
106. Compare Pritchett v. Board of Comm'rs, 42 Ind. App. 3, 85 N.E. 32 (1908) (an
intrusion where plaintiff was assailed by noise and profanity from a neighboring jail);
Stevens v. Rockport Granite Co., 216 Mass. 486, 104 N.E. 371 (1914) (nuisance where a
nearby quarry's machinery emitted loud, penetrating noises). Consider also a creditor
harassment case which was held to be a nuisance. Wiggins v. Moskins Credit Clothing
Store, 137 F. Supp. 764 (E.D.S.C. 1956).
107. W.L. PROSSER, TORTS, § 89 at 591 (4th ed. 1971).
108. Id. at 575, 577.
109. Prosser, supra note 4, at 389ff, 409.
110. Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 326 (1966). Consider also the types of cases reported at Prosser,
supra note 4, at 390-91 which have not been brought successfully as intrusion cases:
noises that disturb church services, bad manners, harsh names, insulting gestures in
public, a landlord who stops by for rent on Sunday morning. The mental distress cases
have considered the problems in extending protection to trivial intrusions and are
designed to obviate those problems. W.L. PROSSER, TORTS, § 12 at 52.
111. Gerety, supra note 2, at 238.
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much of its value." 2 These restrictions simply reflect the spe-
cific focus of the mental distress tort on harassment." 3 Substi-
tuting the vague and unfocused "offensiveness" standard of
Prosser may upset the balance reached by the mental distress
tort. Further, such a standard could be manipulated politically
to attack unkempt appearances or different lifestyles.
The other interest being protected by the intrusion tort, free-
dom from prying, is not fraught with these difficulties. Al-
though it is said to be based on trespass," 4 it is better thought
of as a counterpart to the fourth amendment." 5 Consequently,
its legal profile is already well-defined by fourth amendment
cases. Thus, although it is said that the tort occurs only if in-
formation is gathered," 6 it is better to view the attempt to
gather information as sufficient for a violation of privacy, just
as an illegal search can occur if the police enter the wrong
apartment but gather no evidence.'1 7 Further, it is the ability
to gather information of a private nature which is the feared
offense; a prying has occurred, for example, where a store has
its employees observe customers in the dressing rooms, even if
the stated purpose is the prevention of shoplifting. The tort, in
a sense then, is not a specific intent tort; it is sufficient that
private information be seen or heard, after one has intention-
ally placed oneself in a position to be privy to the details. As
noted above, this aspect of intrusion can be analyzed by the
112. See, e.g., Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973) (court very cautious in
granting an injunction against a photographer to prevent him from harassing Jackie
Onassis and her children in public); see also Prosser, supra note 4, at 391. But cf. Daily
Times Democrat v. Graham, 276 Ala. 380, 162 So. 2d 474 (1964) (Not all actions occurring
in a public place may be characterized as open to the public; a woman whose dress was
blown upward in a "fun house" has an actionable claim for intrusion when a photo-
graph thereof is published).
113. The tort is said not to be sufficiently expansive, for it requires intentional, cal-
culated distress and has stringent proof-of-injury rules. This objection, however, is not
well taken, for in most jurisdictions it is sufficient to show that the defendant was reck-
less as to resulting distress. W.L. PROSSER, TORTS § 12 at 60. The special damage rules
only apply if the plaintiff is suing in negligence and asking for damages for mental
distress accompanying physical injury. Id. § 54. Courts have been hesitant to push the
tort beyond recklessness.
114. Ezer, supra note 103, at 64; Prosser, supra note 4, at 389-90.
115. Ezer, supra note 103, at 66-7; Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701, 704 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 947 (1969).
116. Nader v. General Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560, 307 N.Y.S.2d 647, 255 N.E.2d 765,
769 (1970).
117. E.g., Monroe v. Darr, 221 Kan. 281, 559 P.2d 322 (1977) (sheriff who entered the
wrong apartment, in which plaintiff was sleeping, liable for invasion of privacy unless
justified by warrant or privilege).
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developing methodology." 8
B. Appropriation
Prosser describes this tort as "appropriation, for the defend-
ant's ... advantage, of the plaintiff's name or likeness.""' 9 Ap-
propriation was the earliest of the four categories to be
recognized, 120 and, accordingly, its profile is fairly well-de-
fined.' 2' No constitutional problems arise as long as the tort is
confined to the direct commercial exploitation of the name or
likeness in the sense of using it in an advertisement. For ex-
ample, the profitmaking motive of newspapers does not taint
their use of a person's name or likeness for non-advertising
purposes. 122
Appropriation is concerned with whether the plaintiff is a
public personality. As Prosser defines it, appropriation best
protects public plaintiffs, and the tort falls under the auspices
of a right of publicity 123 more than a right of privacy. 24 The
118. See supra text accompanying notes 24-33. It would be necessary to analyze
intrusion under a scope of consent analysis if the tort is to become more than simply
an analogue to the fourth amendment. In Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), the
Court held that installation of a "pen register," a device that records the numbers di-
aled from a particular telephone, is not an impermissible search based on the fact that
the plaintiff understood that the phone company would maintain a record of all phone
numbers called for billing purposes. But it does not follow that the plaintiff would
consent to the use of these records for other purposes. See id. at 748 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). The intrusion tort would allow the release of information for limited pur-
poses without losing all control over its use, even though the fourth amendment would
not.
119. Prosser, supra note 4, at 401.
120. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905). See also
Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538 (1902), in which the tort was not
recognized. The New York legislature responded by passing a statute which provides
a cause of action when an individual's name or likeness is commercially appropriated
and which provides the basis for most of New York's privacy litigation. N.Y. Crv.
RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1976). Commentators differ strongly on the question
of whether the statute incorporates a right of publicity and whether a common law
right of privacy exists independently of the statute. See Gerety, supra note 2, at 248
n.55; Zurofsky, Constitutional Law--Privacy Torts-First Amendment Does Not Privi-
lege Violation of Right of Publicity-Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 31
RUTGERS L. REV. 269, 274 n.57 (1978); Note, First Amendment Theory Applied To The
Right of Publicity, 19 B.C.L. REV. 277, 278 n.11 (1978).
121. See Kalven, supra note 109, at 331.
122. Prosser, supra note 4, at 405; see also Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 304 N.Y. 354,
107 N.E.2d 485 (1952) (broadcast of a football half-time show was not an appropriation
because not associated with the intervening commercial).
123. The right of publicity was first recognized in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps
Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868-69 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). Since
that case, several other jurisdictions have followed its lead in distinguishing between
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type of plaintiffs most likely to utilize Prosser's tort are public
persons or celebrities whose names or likenesses have com-
mercial value in selling products. Public plaintiffs or celebri-
ties have "waived" to some extent their privacy interests by
seeking publicity or by acquiescing to it.'25 While perhaps they
still retain some private aspects of their lives,'26 they certainly
have transformed their names or likenesses into public aspects
of their lives. It would remove any meaning from "privacy" to
say that what the defendant publicizes can be kept from the
public eye because it is "private."'2 7 Further, as Prosser ad-
mits, the appropriation tort protects a right in the nature of a
property right, not a personal right. 28 This is not an unimpor-
tant question of labeling; 29 the classification will determine
vastly different substantive results. A privacy right is personal,
and neither assignable, nor inheritable. 130 Thus, to construe
appropriation as a privacy right could compromise the inher-
ent value of the tort in protecting the value of a name or like-
ness. For example, if that name or likeness is not assignable
for exclusive use in advertisement, it will not be worth as
much.' 3' Finally, the other three privacy torts of Prosser re-
the right of publicity and the right of privacy. See, e.g., Memphis Dev. Found. v. Fac-
tors, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 1323, 1330 (W.D. Tenn. 1977); Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400
F. Supp. 836, 843 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc.,
294 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1968) ajfd, 301 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1969).
124. Many of the following arguments are from Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19
LAw & CoNrEMP. PROBS. 203 (1954).
125. Prosser, supra note 4, at 411; cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345
(1974).
126. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 301-02 n.4 (1964)
(Goldberg, J., concurring).
127. See O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941).
128. Prosser, supra note 4, at 406. See also Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the
First Amendment, 76 CoLum. L. REv. 1205, 1305 n.461 (1976). But see Bloustein, supra
note 6, at 968 (suggesting that the tort does not involve a proprietary interest).
129. See Prosser, supra note 4, at 406; Bloustein, supra note 6, at 968.
130. See Prosser, supra note 4, at 408 and cases cited supra note 122.
131. In Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323
(1979), the California Supreme Court held that the heirs of Bela Lugosi had no prop-
erty interest in his name and likeness. This is contrary to the concept that the right of
publicity or the right created by appropriation is his property right, not a personal
right, and therefore can be inherited. The rationale of the California Supreme Court,
however, was that the right was a personal right and did not survive his death; after
death the name is in the public domain. But see Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579
F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979) (assignees of a likeness of Elvis
Presley could enjoin its exploitation after his death); Martin Luther King, Jr. Center
for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Products, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 854 (N.D. Ga.
1981) (right to publicity must have matured during the owner's lifetime through
exploitation).
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quire the tortious act to be "offensive". 132 This requirement is
not found explicitly in the appropriation tort. To add it, as in
the argument that the very commercialization of the plaintiff's
identity is offensive, 133 would withhold the protection of the
tort from those who need it most. Public figures or celebrities,
especially those who have endorsed products in the past,
would be hard pressed to claim that commercialization is of-
fensive per se. The "offensiveness" of the appropriation is
somewhat irrelevant to the damage that public figures or celeb-
rities claim, the injury being the lack of remuneration for the
use of their endorsements and the damage to future good-
will. 134 The tort of appropriation, in the sense of a right to pub-
licity, concerns the right to develop, keep, and market a value
in one's name or likeness, and is not a privacy right.
Where one does not seek publicity, but wishes to keep one's
name or likeness out of publications, a right of publicity realis-
tically offers little relief beyond an injunction.3 5 Private plain-
tiffs, after all, are not worried about the goodwill in their image,
nor the fees they could command, for they have little, if any,
claim to either.136 An injunction may be the proper remedy in
many cases, but it can be expected that private plaintiffs would
also wish to recover damages for the commercialization and
the resultant mental distress.'37
An analysis of the types of appropriation cases which apply
to private plaintiffs demonstrates that the relevant damage in-
terests can often be adequately protected by defamation law,
by the intrusion tort, and by the mental distress tort. In addi-
tion, the developing method of analysis can be applied to give
relief in circumstances not covered by these three torts, or by
the "right of publicity" cases. 138
132. Prosser, supra note 4, at 390-91, 397, 400 ("offensive" or not tolerable to commu-
nity morals). cf. Treece, Commercial Exploitation of Names, Licenses and Personal
Histories, 51 TEX. L. REV. 637, 640 (1973) (that the nature of the injury to self-esteem by
appropriation is "elusive").
133. Bloustein, supra note 6, at 987-88.
134. See generally Nimmer, supra note 123.
135. An injunction can be awarded when appropriate. E.g., Flake v. Greensboro
News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938).
136. If companies had to pay private plaintiffs, they probably would look elsewhere
for advertising material.
137. Bloustein, supra note 6, at 986-88; Treece, supra note 131, at 640. The first two
appropriations cases are illustrative. See supra note 119.
138. E.g., Russell v. Marboro Books, 18 Misc. 2d 166, 183 N.Y.S.2d 8 (Sup,. Ct. 1959)
(original consent to publication of picture may be inoperative where picture changed
in context).
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One type of appropriation case involves an endorsement,
where the plaintiff's name or likeness is associated with the
selling of a good or service.'39 This is the core area of the right
of publicity. 140 It is also the core area of the private plaintiffs
appropriation claim, for it is in being used in an advertisement
and through the commercialization of a person's identity that
one is injured.14 ' Ordinarily, a plaintiff's only remedy for ap-
propriation is injunctive relief.142 In those cases where more
has been lost than privacy-for instance, if the plaintiff's repu-
tation is damaged by being associated with the particular prod-
uct 143 or if the advertisement is done in a particularly offensive
way' -an action for defamation may lie.'45
139. Prosser, supra note 4, at 401-2 nn.156-9. See also, Treece, supra note 131, at 641-
48.
140. Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). "[Ilt is common knowledge that many promi-
nent persons ... far from having their feelings bruised ... would feel sorely deprived
if they no longer received money for authorizing advertisements ..... This right of
publicity would usually yield them no money unless it could be made the subject of an
exclusive grant .... .
141. Treece, supra note 131, at 640. "Individuals of average sensibility do not suffer
when their names appear in a favorable light in a news item or when a magazine dis-
plays their likenesses in a flattering context. The peculiar nature of advertising, rather
than the mere fact of publicity, must cause whatever injury occurs." See Bloustein,
supra note 6, at 988.
142. Generally, mere commercialization alone is not enough to give more than nom-
inal damages unless special damages are proven. See Flake v. Greensboro News Co.,
212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938); Miller v. Madison Square Garden Corp., 176 Misc. 714,28
N.Y.S.2d 811 (1941); Almind v. Sea Beach Ry. Co., 157 A.D. 230, 141 N.Y.S. 842 (1912). It
has been suggested that mere commercial exploitation engenders sufficient harm to
justify damages under the appropriation tort beyond injunctive relief. Bloustein,
supra note 6, at 988. The problem is how to measure these damages. In the other
privacy torts there is at least a threshold level of "offensiveness" which must be met
before an action will lie. In defamation law, loss of reputation is calculated objectively
by the archaic per se-per quod distinction and by the usual requirement of pecuniary
loss as a prerequisite for any recovery for a per quod violation. W.L. PROSSER, TORTS
§ 112 at 763-64 (4th ed. 1971). A loss due to mere commercialization does not have these
standards, and may be incalculable. See Kalven, supra note 109, at 334. Given these
difficulties, it is unlikely that the position that mere commercialization gives rise to
more than nominal damages will be widely accepted. In any event, it is likely that all
incidents in which a plaintiff has truly been offended will be covered by defamation; as
a policy matter, anything not so covered probably should not be.
143. See O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1942). In Peck v. Tribune
Co., 214 U.S. 185 (1909) (Holmes, J.), defamation was found when a temperate nurse
was shown endorsing whisky.
144. See, e.g., Burton v. Crowell Pub. Co., 82 F.2d 154 (2d Cir. 1936) where due to an
optical illusion the plaintiff was shown in a sexually humiliating light as he held a
saddle in a cigarette ad. The court reversed an award of a summary judgment for the
defendant based on defamation.
145. In many appropriation cases, defamation has also been found. E.g., Pavesich v.
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A second type of appropriation case occurs when the plain-
tiff's image is shown or sold, either accompanying a product'4 6
or for other business reasons. 147 These, too, are right of public-
ity cases. Although there is no attribution of direct endorse-
ment, there is an indirect effect: the goodwill and notoriety of
the plaintiff's reputation is used to bring attention to the prod-
uct. Leading examples of this type of appropriation include
the use of an actress's picture in lockets, 148 the use of baseball
players' pictures in popcorn and chewing gum packets,149 and
even the use of an actress's picture in a photography booklet
put out by a camera manufacturer. 50 The link can be very at-
tenuated, and yet an action will lie.151 Private plaintiffs may
avail themselves of the right of publicity action despite their
previous failure to develop or exploit goodwill in their image,
on the presumption that such appropriation denotes some
marketability in their image. To that extent, then, they be-
come celebrities. Since the commercialization is indirect,
there appears to be little, if any, basis for a commercialization
action alone; indeed, very few cases of this type have been
reported.15 2
New England Life Ins., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905). An alternative is to frame the case
as a false light case, but appropriation may be a more powerful means of protection. In
O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941), a college football star was held
not to have a false light claim for having his picture used on a calendar put out by a
beer company despite the fact that the imputation of being intemperate was defama-
tory among his peers (he was active in a group denouncing the use of alcohol by teen-
agers). As the dissent pointed out, because he was a publicized personality, he would
have had a greater likelihood of success if he had framed the issue as a loss of a right to
publicity. Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938), is often con-
sidered a false light case, but this appears to be incorrect since the innocent mistake
was later corrected; the mens rea for false light is at least negligence. See infra note
254.
146. Prosser, supra note 4, at 402 n.159.
147. Id. at n.161.
148. Lane v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 171 Misc. 66, 11 N.Y.S.2d 199 (Sup. Ct. 1939), affd,
256 A.D. 1065, 12 N.Y.S.2d 352 (1939).
149. Jansen v. Hilo Packing Co., Inc., 202 Misc. 900, 118 N.Y.S.2d 162 (Sup. Ct.), affid,
282 A.D. 935, 125 N.Y.S.2d 648 (1952).
150. Selsman v. Universal Photo Books, Inc., 18 A.D.2d 151, 238 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1963).
151. In Miller v. Madison Square Garden Corp., 176 Misc. 714,28 N.Y.S.2d 811 (1941),
an aging Pony Express rider who had tried to capitalize on an 1887 race between him-
self on a bicycle and a horseless carriage collected 6 cents for the use of a picture from
that race in a program at the Garden.
152. Perhaps the closest case is Almind v. Sea Beach Ry. Co., 157 A.D. 230, 141
N.Y.S. 842 (1912), rev'g, 78 Misc. 445, 139 N.Y.S. 559 (1912), where in a 3-2 decision, the
court found a "technical" violation of the N.Y. appropriation statute in the use of a film
showing the plaintiff who had consented orally, but the law requires written consent.
The court brought the action under the law by finding "advertising" in the use of her
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A related use of an image must be distinguished. Where the
image or name is not used to sell a collateral product, but is
used in connection with a news story, the press is privileged to
print it without consent.15 3 A right of publicity still exists, but is
subject to the constraints of the first amendment.154  The
press's privilege is not absolute, however. In the leading case,
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,155 the United
States Supreme Court upheld the right of publicity (under
Ohio law) against a news broadcast of the plaintiff's human
cannonball act. The station showed the 15-second act, in full,
on its nighttime news program. In analyzing the policy inter-
ests underlying the right of publicity, the Court recognized
that absent the ability to charge admission to see the act, the
plaintiff would, in all likelihood, never have created it. The free
broadcast had satiated a part of the paying public. By analo-
gizing to copyright laws, which provide economic incentives for
the creation of copyrightable materials, the Court held that a
strong public policy to foster creativity was embodied in the
first amendment and that the press's rights must be limited ac-
cordingly.5 6  In effect, the Court interpreted the first amend-
ment as optimizing freedom of speech (variety), not merely
speech (quantity). The courts, by limiting the press's right to
broadcast, 157 and the copyright laws, through economic incen-
tives, have provided the public with many creative forms of ex-
pictures to "sell" a cause, that is, the safe way to enter cars. The case really stands for
the proposition that there is an advertising value to companies in developing their
goodwill through "public service" ads.
153. This was firmly announced under the New York appropriation statute in Mur-
ray v. New York Magazine Co., 27 N.Y.2d 406, 267 N.E.2d 256 (1971) (picture of plaintiff
in Irish garb, taken while he was watching a St. Patrick's Day parade, allowed to illus-
trate cover of magazine with a story on Irish immigrants).
154. Comparable first amendment problems may also subsist in "commercial
speech" use of names or images, and may, in the future, be found to restrict the appro-
priation tort. But see Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New
York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (first amendment protects commercial speech, but to a lesser
extent than other protected expression). Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion in
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer Council, 424 U.S. 589 (1976)
noted that while commercial product advertising was protected by the first amend-
ment, it could be regulated to a greater degree-at least respecting false or deceptive
claims-than could ideological speech. He noted that an advertiser has the ability to
verify its claims scientifically, and thus would not be chilled by stringent regulation.
This principle appears consistent with a plaintiff's rights in appropriation cases, i.e.,
preventing a false or deceptive endorsement.
155. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
156. Id. at 576-77.
157. The press is not totally prohibited from covering such an act in its news broad-
cast. For example, it could properly present its analysis of the act and show part of it.
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pression which otherwise might never have existed.158 Private
plaintiffs would not benefit from this Zacchini rationale, how-
ever, when privacy, in the sense of neither developing nor mar-
keting an image or act, is involved.
An individual's privacy may need protection when, because
of involvement in a newsworthy event, a private person's name
or likeness and the event are used commercially. If the use is
for advertising purposes, as by a "good Samaritan" company
which aided the plaintiff and then distributed reprints of a
news article about the aid, an appropriation action is proper.159
If the use is to sell the story itself, as in a dramatization or
fictionalization, an appropriation action is also proper, but
within first amendment constraints. The leading case is Binns
v. Vitagraph Co. of America,160 in which the court developed
the principle that when the presentation is not "factual," the
work is only "entertainment" and, therefore, not protected as
news. 6 ' A series of movies were created chronicling Binns'
story: Binns was the first to use radio in a sea rescue and
Binns was held to have a cause of action for the exploitation of
his likeness. But the Binns court was walking on a tightrope.
On the one side, news is protected, and as the United States
Supreme Court has recently recognized in defamation'62 and
privacy 163 cases, reporters are to be given liberal scope for
making mistakes in the facts. On the other side, fiction is pro-
The press could freely comment on the act, even if their opinion would economically
ruin it, but they could not reveal any trick parts or clever twists.
158. An interesting case in this vein is Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 59 Misc.
444, 299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (1968), in which the comedian Pat Paulsen, who had developed a
political satire act including a "Paulsen for President" campaign, sued to enjoin a
poster manufacturer from selling "Paulsen for President" posters without a license. In
what would probably be an incorrect decision after Zacchini, the New York court de-
nied the injunction, thinking the poster a form of political speech. Perhaps the court
was concerned that politicians could then enjoin posters satirizing them. But in Paul-
sen, the plaintiff, unlike a politician, had actively created and exploited an act which
was stolen by the poster manufacturer. Another case in this line is Redmond v. Co-
lumbia Pictures Corp., 277 N.Y. 707, 14 N.E.2d 636, affg, 253 A.D. 708, 1 N.Y.S.2d 643
(1938), where a professional "trick" golfer recovered for the use of pictures of his act in
a movie on golf.
159. E.g., Canessa v. J. I. Kislak, Inc., 97 N.J. Super. 327, 235 A.2d 62 (1967) (real
estate company which helped plaintiff find and finance a house disbursed reprints of a
news article on this help).
160. 210 N.Y. 51, 103 N.E. 1108 (1913).
161. See Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76 COLUM. L.
REV. 1205, 1300 (1976).
162. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
163. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
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tected by the first amendment, 164 even in films.'65 As a result,
many exceptions to the Binns principle have been recognized:
untrue statements alone do not transfer a work into the class
of fiction (where privacy statutes apply),'66 and de minimus
references to the plaintiff in novels are allowable;'67 fiction can
be based on real people, 168 even closely or thinly based;'69
drawings depicting an event are treated more liberally than
pictures.7 0 It was soon said that as long as the work was
fictional it could not be the subject of an appropriation.' 7 '
This framework, however, can be criticized for failing to pro-
vide a clear standard of when a minor error becomes too
fictional or when fiction becomes too factual. 7 2 It also removes
protection from satire; in light of its obvious basis on real peo-
ple, satire could be the subject of an appropriation action, and
because it is "entertainment," there is no persuasive argument
which can provide it with a news status.'73 Further, this frame-
work fails to provide a clear standard for dealing with the "new
fiction," in other words, fiction written as if fact and based on
fact."'74 Finally, the privacy interest itself is not very compel-
ling. Where the fictionalization is not defamatory or offensive,
one is still entitled to have the record "set straight" which, if
the record is innocuous or even flattering in its falsity, is a high
164. The pornography cases make this clear. See e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476 (1957).
165. See, e.g., Kingsley Internat'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959) (film
of LADY CHATTERLY'S LOVER).
166. Koussevitzky v. Alen, Towne, & Heath, Inc., 188 Misc. 479, 68 N.Y.S.2d 779, affd,
272 A.D. 759, 69 N.Y.S.2d 432 (1947).
167. Damron v. Doubleday, Doran & Co., Inc., 133 Misc. 302, 231 N.Y.S. 444 (1928),
affd, 226 A.D. 796, 234 N.Y.S. 773 (1929).
168. W.L. PROSSER, TORTS § 117 at 806 n.40; see also Hill, Defamation and Privacy
Under the First Amendment, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1208, 1305 (1954).
169. Donahue v. Warner Bros. Picture Distributing Corp., 2 Utah 2d 256, 272 P.2d 177
(1954) (movie based on a vaudeville star allowed); Stryker v. Republic Pictures Corpo-
ration, 108 Cal. App. 2d 191, 238 P.2d 670 (1951) (no right of privacy for a real life Ser-
geant Stryker for the John Wayne film "Sands of Iwo Jima" in absence of any
reference to the plaintiff beyond similarity in names or allegation that the fictionalized
portions were inaccurate, discrediting or unwarranted).
170. Molony v. Boys Comics Publishers, Inc., 277 A.D. 166, 98 N.Y.S.2d 119 (1950)
(comic magazine drawings). See also Colyer v. Richard K. Fox Publishing Co., 162 A.D.
297, 146 N.Y.S. 999 (1914).
171. Recent Decisions, Torts-Statutory Right of Privacy, 51 MICH. L. REV. 762 (1953).
172. See Donahue v. Warner Bros. Picture Distributing Corp., 2 Utah 2d 256, 272 P.2d
177 (1954) for a good discussion of this problem.
173. Hill suggests that satirists like Art Buchwald or Aristophanes would not be
protected. See Hill, supra note 160 at 1304-05.
174. E.g. "Roots", "Blind Ambition", and other literature and television programs.
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price to pay for chilling uncertainty. 175 Indeed, classifying an
action protecting this privacy interest as "appropriation" is pe-
culiar, for the interest here is far from the original proprietary
underpinnings of that tort; a public figure does not own the
public facts and news of his biography.176
These problems can be avoided and the privacy and public-
ity interests preserved if it is made clear that there is no com-
mercialization or fictionalization tort aside from the "right of
publicity" tort.177 This may not prove to be a very satisfying
result to many people; indeed, it was the printing of scurrilous
gossip in newspapers which lead Warren and Brandeis to write
their oft-quoted article. 78 It is difficult, however, to resolve the
complicated balancing of interests in a fictionalization case in
the context of a privacy action. In Aquino v. Bulletin Com-
179 cut apany, the court, on appeal, was faced with a fact pattern in-
volving a fictionalized story of a secretly married young girl
whose marriage was promptly annulled. The groom admitted
to entering into the marriage not for love of her, but to spite the
girl's parents. The basic facts of the story were based on truth
but were strongly embellished by the author. Oddly enough,
the jury had found against the putative bride on her cause of
action for invasion of privacy, but in favor of the parents for
theirs. 80 It would not appear that the interest of any of the
175. See e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388-89 (1967) (although the plaintiff was
painted in a heroic light, the Court applied the New York Times v. Sullivan defamation
standard in order to avoid chilling free expression in cases where one is not absolutely
certain of the facts).
176. See e.g., Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 58 Misc. 2d 1, 294
N.Y.S.2d 122 (1968), affid without opinion, 32 A.D.2d 892, 301 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1969).
177. Basically, if the fiction is presented as news and understood as such, or if news
is presented as fiction but understood as really portraying truth, and the fiction is de-
famatory, an action will lie, as long as constitutional standards of breathing space, al-
ready delineated to allow some fiction in news, are met. See Time v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374
(1967), which involved fiction presented as a reenactment, and Cantrell v. Forest City
Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974), which involved fiction presented as news; the Court
applied the New York Times v. Sullivan privilege to allow breathing space. The hard
case would be the implication of truth in a work of fiction, but the principles to distin-
guish defamation from fiction have been developed, e.g., Kelly v. Loew's, Inc., 76 F.
Supp. 473 (D. Mass. 1948) (movie held defamatory which thinly disguised its portrayal
of a naval officer as headstrong and lacking in discipline), and are analogous to stan-
dards for distinguishing protected opinions from defamatory opinions which imply
false facts. These standards, however, are still disputed and evolving. See Christie,
supra note 50.
178. See supra note 1.
179. 190 Pa. Super. 528, 154 A.2d 422 (1959).
180. Id.
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parties was fully balanced and considered in such a decision;
the spurned and embarrassed bride was accorded no relief, de-
spite the characterization of her as disloyal to her parents and
fooled by her spiteful groom. Her parents, who recovered,
were portrayed as insightful and caring. It would appear that
the most suitable balancing of interests in such a context
would be through a libel action. 181 Otherwise it is difficult to
ascertain what interests are being protected, or to be assured
that the standards now guiding juries in such cases would pro-
tect whatever interests one may wish to have protected.
One final type of appropriation case arises when the defend-
ant impersonates the plaintiff for some advantage. 182 Some of
these cases have been improperly classed as false light
cases.'83 Certainly, if the impersonation injured the plaintiff's
reputation, a defamation action would lie.'84 In other circum-
stances, other torts would lie. If the defendant used the ruse to
gain access to private or confidential information, an intrusion
has occurred.'85 If the impersonator passes himself off as a ce-
lebrity, an unfair competition action will lie.'86 Otherwise, if no
harm occurs, no action should be available. 87
C. False Light
Prosser described this tort as "publicity which places the
plaintiff in a false light in the public eye."'88 It seems very
much like defamation; indeed, Prosser himself admitted:
There has been a good deal of overlapping of defamation in the
181. Other tort claims may be available such as intrusion or right of publicity ac-
tions. See supra text accompanying notes 154-58.
182. Prosser, supra note 4, at 403 nn.166-68.
183. Wade, supra note 7, at 1097-98.
184. See infra notes 206-07. See, e.g., Prosser, supra note 4, at 403 n.168, involving
naming the wrong person as the father on a birth certificate. Cf. Wade, supra note 7, at
1098.
185. See Corcoran v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 572 S.W.2d 212 (Mo. 1978) (former
daughter-in-law in pretending to still be married to plaintiff and having the telephone
company send plaintiff's bills to her committed an intrusion when she opened them).
See Prosser, supra note 4, at 403 n.166.
186. Although not quite on point, Edgar Rice Burroughs, Inc. v. Charlton Publica-
tions, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 731 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) indicates that the famous character Tarzan
is protected from others using the name and personality in unauthorized works. In the
"Aunt Jemima" case, Gardella v. Log Cabin Products Co., 89 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1937), the
court noted that if there was confusion or deception, an imitator of the Aunt Jemima
actress could be liable for unfair competition.
187. See Prosser, supra note 4, at 403, discussing that anyone could change their
name to "Rockefeller" if they wished, without falsely impersonating the real one.
188. See Prosser, supra note 4, at 389.
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false-light cases ... The privacy cases do go considerably be-
yond the narrow limits of defamation ... The question may
well be raised ... whether this branch of the tort is not capa-
ble of swallowing up and engulfing the whole law of public def-
amation; .... If that ... be the case ... what of the
numerous restrictions and limitations which have hedged defa-
mation about for many years, in the interest of freedom of the
press and the discouragement of trivial and extortionate
claims?1
8 9
Subsequently, it was argued that defamation should be consol-
idated within the false light tort.19 ° To some extent, this would
be welcomed, at least among those who condemn the "anoma-
lies and absurdities of the law of defamation."'19' As a tactical
matter, consolidation makes sense, for there has been much
resistance to directly modifying defamation law.'92 This resist-
ance may be well-based, however, for the false light tort is de-
monstrably unnecessary and a poor substitute for defamation.
The tort is unnecessary because its cases could have been
covered by other, more established torts. It has often been rec-
ognized that many false light cases were also defamation
cases, 93 and, consequently, in many factual situations courts
will not recognize a false light action distinct from that of defa-
mation. 94 Most of the cases which Prosser cited as establish-
ing the false light tort were defamation cases, in the form of
imputing misrepresentations in advertisements, 195 profes-
sional incompetence, 96 unchastity in a woman 97 and criminal
189. Id. at 400-01.
190. See Wade, supra note 7.
191. Id. at 1121. See generally, Keeton, Defamation and Freedom of the Press, 54
TEX. L. REV. 1221 (1976).
192. See, e.g., Christie, Defamatory Opinions and the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1621 (1977).
193. See, e.g., Prosser, supra note 4, at 400 n.146; see generally, 16 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV.
540.
194. E.g., Kapellas v. Kofman, 1 Cal. 3d 20, 35 n.16, 81 Cal. Rptr. 360, 459 P.2d 912
(1969); Rawlins v. The Hutchinson Publ. Co., 218 Kan. 295, 543 P.2d 988 (1975).
195. Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905); Fos-
ter-Millburn Co. v. Chinn, 134 Ky. 424, 120 S.W. 364 (1909); Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo.
App. 652, 134 S.W. 1076 (1911). These cases involved fictitious testimonials used in
advertising.
196. D'Altomonte v. New York Herald Co., 154 A.D. 453, 139 N.Y.S. 200 (1913), modi-
fied to a defamation case, 208 N.Y. 596, 102 N.E. 1101 (1913) (attributed a ridiculous
cannibal story to a respected anthropologist); Peay v. Curtis Publishing Co., 78 F.
Supp. 305 (D.D.C. 1948) (cheating taxi driver); Valerni v. Hearst Magazines, Inc., 99
N.Y.S.2d 866 (1949) (waiter).
197. Martin v. Johnson Publishing Co., 157 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1956) ("man hungry" wo-
man); Semler v. Ultem Publications, 170 Misc. 551, 9 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1938) (picture in a
[Vol. 6
No. 1] ANALYZING PRIVACY TORTS
or delinquent behavior.'98 Other cases cited by Prosser were
actually appropriation (right of publicity),199 intrusion, 00 or
mental distress cases. 201 In the remaining cases, the courts felt
satisfied to rest on privacy grounds, but the facts seemed quite
analogous to these other tort cases and especially to defama-
tion. Two cases involve the implication of sexual misconduct,
in the context of advertising20 2 and debt collection. 2 3 Several
cases imputed criminal conduct, such as peddling drugs204 or
violating the Hatch Act.20 5 In this vein is a series of "rogues'
gallery" cases in which plaintiff's name and picture is posted
among a group of criminals either before any conviction or af-
ter an acquittal.20 6 Two interesting impersonation cases also
seem to be based in defamation. In one, plaintiff's insurance
company, in seeking witnesses for an accident involving the
plaintiff, had a woman employee pose as his wife.20 7 Since he
was engaged to be married, this suggests sexual misconduct,
criminal misconduct (bigamy) and general disrepute (liar,
sex magazine); Russell v. Marboro Books, 18 Misc. 2d 166, 183 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1959) (bawdy
bed sheet ad).
198. Garner v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 546 (S:D.N.Y. 1951) (murder);
Metzger v. Dell Publishing Co., 207 Misc. 182, 136 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1955) (juvenile delin-
quent); Linehan v. Linehan, 134 Cal. App. 2d 250, 285 P.2d 326 (1955) (bigamy).
199. Lord Byron v. Johnston, 2 Mer. 29, 35 Eng. Rep. 851 (1816) (spurious and infer-
ior poem); Hogan v. A. S. Barnes & Co., 114 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 314 (Pa. C.P. 1957) (book on
gold purports to include advice by the plaintiff); Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212
N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938) (mistaken advertisement) (see also supra note 144).
200. Bennett v. Norban, 396 Pa. 94, 151 A.2d 476 (1959) (while a false light tort was
alleged due to imputation of shoplifting, this was really an intrusion case because the
shopkeeper looked in the plaintiffs purse, pockets, and bags without consent).
201. Norris v. Moskin Stores, Inc., 272 Ala. 174, 132 So. 2d 321 (1961) (overzealous
creditor who hounded the plaintiffs in public, telling the world of the debts).
202. Krby v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 53 Cal. App. 2d 207, 127 P.2d 577 (1942) ("ecto-
plasmic playmate").
203. Freeman v. Busch Jewelry Co., 98 F. Supp. 963 (N.D. Ga. 1951) (the court did
not label the action, although it felt it was "more likely" a libel action than a privacy
action).
204. Thompson v. Close-up, Inc., 277 A.D. 848, 98 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1950).
205. Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co., 166 Or. 482, 113 P.2d 438 (1941).
206. Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 115 La. 479, 39 So. 499 (1905); State v. Tyndall, 224 Ind.
364, 66 N.E.2d 755 (1946). These two cases are based on Downs v. Swann, 111 Md. 53, 73
Atl. 653 (1909), which never mentioned libel but noted that the listing "would be a
permanent proof of dishonesty." Today, the plaintiff would probably sue under § 1983
or the Bivens doctrine for violation of a constitutional right. See, e.g., Wisconsin v.
Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971). But see Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (Rehn-
quist, J.) (limiting this action and saying the best recourse is defamation). See gener-
ally Christie, supra note 50.
207. Hamilton v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., 82 So. 2d 61 (La. App.), appeal
transferred, 226 La. 644, 76 So. 2d 916 (1955).
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cheat and fraud upon a decent woman). In the other case, a
tire company employee posed as the plaintiff to elicit confiden-
tial tire prices from another company; in the process the im-
poster revealed the "confidential" prices of the plaintiff's tire
company.20 8 Since the imposter's actions reflect on the plaintiff
and suggest that the plaintiff cannot be trusted in business
dealings, they could injure the plaintiff's relationship with
these companies, and slander per se has occurred. Finally, two
cases cited as false light cases involved tort problems dis-
cussed above, including fictionalization 20 9 and mental distress
caused by debt collectors. 210
There are several remaining cases which represent three ba-
sic themes; one is the use of the plaintiff's picture to illustrate a
story with which the plaintiff has no reasonable connection.
Most of the cases involve a defamatory implied connection.2
Only two of the cases appear to fall in a pure false light area.
In one, a couple's picture was used to illustrate an article on
the "wrong type of love" (love that is based upon sex and not
affection), although the couple were happily married.212 In the
other, a well-publicized picture of a child who had been in an
accident was used twenty months later to illustrate a story on
the carelessness of children, even though this child had not
been careless. 213 A libel count was dropped and the decision
rested on privacy grounds. Even assuming arguendo that
these decisions are correct, other torts besides false light might
have given relief here. In a companion case to the "wrong type
of love" incident, the same picture was published without any
defamatory legend, and yet the court found a loss of privacy on
the basis of intrusion (a breach of the scope of consent).1 4
The picture was taken as the couple innocently sat inside their
diner. The court felt that "[t]hey may be unthinking of the
stares of those in the vicinity and thus unaffected by them, but
that is far from consenting to the photographing of their like-
208. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Vandergriff, 52 Ga. App. 662, 184 S.E. 452 (1936).
209. Strickler v. N.B.C., 167 F. Supp. 68 (S.D. Cal. 1958) (movie thinly disguised an
account of plaintiff in the war).
210. Biederman's of Springfield v. Wright, 322 S.W.2d 892 (Mo. 1959) (citing Housh v.
Peth, which is a privacy case only because Ohio has no mental distress tort; see supra
note 104).
211. See, e.g., Prosser, supra note 4, at 399 nn.137-42.
212. Gill v. Curtis Publishing Co., 38 Cal. 2d 273, 239 P.2d 630 (1952).
213. Leverton v. Curtis Publishing Co., 192 F.2d 974 (3d Cir. 1951).
214. Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 239 P.2d 636 (Cal. 1952).
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ness and publishing it in a magazine." '215 In the child-careless-
ness case, this intrusion argument is obviated by the fact that
the picture was taken and publicized as news in the first
place.216 The decision of this court in Leverton, however, has
not been followed in other jurisdictions2 17 and may be consid-
ered the type of spurious decision which the false light tort's
vague definition of "offensiveness" would be likely to produce.
The second false light theme can be illustrated by cases in
which professionals sue for incidents that would not be defam-
atory to anonymous people; examples include an actor said to
have entered an embarrassing popularity contest,218 another
actor put in an undignified light in a "doctored" advertise-
ment,21 9 a lawyer advertising a paper-copier which he, in fact,
had returned as unsatisfactory, 220 a rabbi whose name was at-
tributed to a fictitious interview on sex found in a romance
magazine, 221 and a candidate for national office whose name
was attributed to a party not representing his views.222 While
some of these cases, particularly the ones involving actors,
could be brought as right of publicity cases, they all have in
common an injury which damages professional reputation.
Defamation has long protected professional or business stand-
223 thsting, and these types of cases could, therefore, be treated as
ordinary defamation cases.
The cases upon which Prosser based his false light tort
could, except for the child-carelessness case, have been char-
acterized as defamation, appropriation, intrusion or mental
215. Id. at 638.
216. Arguably, it was not an intrusion in the first instance only because of the im-
plied consent of people caught in a newsworthy public situation to have their picture
taken and their story told; in the second publication of the picture, the paper had gone
too far and violated the scope of this implied consent. Alternatively, since the later
article had no reasonable connection with the picture, arguably the article is a "collat-
eral product" using the innate goodwill of the picture to bring attention to it. Thus, the
child's right of publicity in that picture has been appropriated. See supra text accom-
panying notes 145-51; cf. the right of publicity of an "innately" attractive woman.
217. E.g., Nelson v. Times, 373 A.2d 1221 (Me. 1977) (not invasion of privacy to pub-
lish in connection with a book review or picture of a child which had previously been
published in a news article).
218. Marks v. Jaffa, 6 Misc. 290, 26 N.Y.S. 908 (1893).
219. Sinclair v. Postal Tel. and Cable Co., 72 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1935).
220. Fairfield v. American Photocopying Equip. Co., 138 Cal. App. 2d 82, 291 P.2d 194
(1955).
221. Goldberg v. Ideal Publishing Co., 210 N.Y.S.2d 928 (1960).
222. State v. Hinkle, 131 Wash. 86, 229 P. 317 (1924).
223. It is a per se violation to impune professional reputation. W.L. PROSSER, TORTS
§ 112 (4th ed. 1971).
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distress cases. Such alternate characterizations would, per-
haps, have been preferable given vague standards for false
light liability.
A third theme in the false light area has developed since
Prosser published his classification scheme and suggests a
stronger basis for this tort. The theme is fictionalization of
news or biography presented as truth, but in a manner which
is more laudatory than defamatory, for the purpose of enhanc-
ing sales. Typical cases include: Time, Inc. v. Hill,224 in which
the plaintiff and his family, held hostage in their suburban
home, were portrayed in an article as reacting heroically to al-
leged violence; Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co.,225 a case
involving the story of a widow and her family after her hus-
band's tragic death, which embellished her courage; and Spahn
v. Julian Messner, Inc.,226 in which a biography of ,a baseball
star was glorified to appeal to a juvenile audience. This theme
fits with difficulty under the other established torts, but some
suggestions of alternate classifications can be made. First, al-
though the stories were not defamatory on their face due to
their laudatory light, they are defamatory among the plaintiff's
peers who know the truth, for it appears that the plaintiff has
lied.227 Second, an appropriation (violation of a right of public-
ity) may have occurred. Although the use of plaintiff's name or
image is related to the story, one can also argue that the fiction
itself is being used to sell a collateral product, the truth. The
distinction between appropriating a name or image to sell a
collateral product and doing so to sell the truth as news was
made in the context of the right of publicity.228 In either case,
224. 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (while the publication was an account of a play, it was
presented as reporting on a reenactment of the event).
225. 419 U.S. 245 (1974).
226. 18 N.Y.2d 324, 221 N.E.2d 543, 274 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1966) (although this case arose
under the N.Y. appropriation law, it presents the same issue as in Hill and Cantrell; see
385 U.S. at 386).
227. Wade, supra note 7, at 1096 explains the decision in Pavesich-which came
down both in libel and privacy-as based on the idea that those friends of the plaintiff
who knew he did not own the insurance he is reported to have said he owned would
think he lied for money.
228. See supra text accompanying note 152. A constitutional privilege probably
does not exist under this suggestion, as a calculated decision to sell truth with fiction
would be "actual malice" under Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389-90 (1967); Spahn v.
Julian Messner, Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 124, 127-28, 233 N.E.2d 840, 843-44, 286 N.Y.S.2d 832, 834-35
(1967). The "new journalism", which presents events realistically by creating charac-
ters who are an amalgam of actual people, would be protected, since it is the implica-
tion of truth and not realism which is objectionable. Even if the story appeared to be
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there is no need for a separate false light tort.
D. Public Disclosure
This is the tort about which Warren and Brandeis were con-
cerned.229 Ironically, it has the most tenuous claim of credibil-
ity today: it has the least definite legal profile,23 ° and may be
unconstitutional. 231 Prosser described it as "public disclosure
of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff. '232 Although
to Warren and Brandeis the interest protected is "privacy, 9233
to Prosser the interest is reputation, and Prosser characterizes
the tort as defamation without the defense of truth.234 This dif-
ference is more than semantic, for it changes the focus from
whether the press is "warranted" in publishing, that is,
whether the information should be left private, 235 to whether
the plaintiff is entitled to relief, that is, whether the publication
is "offensive" or injures reputation. The former formula would
eliminate from the press inoffensive gossip which is not impor-
tant, yet would keep in the news "offensive" acts which are im-
portant to the public; the latter would tend to do the opposite.
Consequently, Prosser's tort does not protect either the pri-
vacy or the first amendment interests very well. This is illus-
trated by two cases involving attempts to escape past
notoriety. In one, the plaintiff had been a prostitute involved in
a sensational murder trial, but had since married and lived a
respectable life.236 In the other case, the plaintiff had been a
child mathematics prodigy, but had since led an obscure life
with eccentric hobbies and with a passion for privacy.237 The
respectable spouse won while the eccentric enfant lost. The
presented as truth, the references to real people may be too tenuous upon which to
base a claim.
229. Prosser, supra note 4, at 392; Bloustein, supra note 6, at 967; Kalven, supra note
109, at 330.
230. Kalven, supra note 109, at 327.
231. See infra text accompanying note 249.
232. Prosser, supra note 4, at 392.
233. See Bloustein, supra note 6, at 966-69.
234. Prosser, supra note 4, at 398.
235. Warren and Brandeis, supra note 1, at 219; See also Franklin, A Constitutional
Problem in Privacy Protection: Legal Inhibitions on Reporting of Facts, 16 STAN. L.
REV. 107, 111 (1963).
236. Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931). See also Briscoe v. Readers
Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1971) (upholding the privacy
claim of a reformed convict whose story was mentioned 11 years later in a hijacking
article read by the classmates of his young daughter).
237. Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
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results are explained on the basis of community mores of what
is offensive to publish.238 The privacy interest of both, how-
ever, seems the same. Certainly, both were offended; indeed,
perhaps the prodigy was even more so, for the article exposing
him is said to have contributed to his early death.239 What is
evident is that a community mores standard protects the pri-
vacy of people the community deems respectable more than it
does that of eccentrics, which seems contrary to the principles
underlying a right of privacy. Further, the first amendment in-
terest of the defendant newspaper in Briscoe was greater than
the interest of the defendant in Sidis, for the play which ex-
posed the former prostitute was based on public records of a
very newsworthy past event, while the article which traced the
life of the prodigy went beyond past records and dug into his
present private life.
The public disclosure cases fall into certain categories.
Some involve revelation of intimate personal details, including
photographs of the human anatomy,24° bizarre habits,241 and
masculine characteristics of a woman.242 Others involve sur-
reptitious photographs, stolen photographs, bribery or other
breaches of trust to gain the material.243 These types of cases
can usually be based either on the intrusion tort, because they
entail "snooping" analogous to illegal police practices, or-by
using the developing method of analysis--on a breach of the
scope of consent.24 A third category involves cases where the
defendant has exceeded permissible bounds. For instance, re-
ports of an individual shirking payment of debts are not action-
able if given to an employer or if revealed to an individual or
238. Prosser, supra note 4, at 397. Another explanation is the public policy in Cali-
fornia of encouraging rehabilitation of former convicts. Briscoe v. Readers Digest, 4
Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1971). This policy may no longer be sufficient
to restrain publication of true facts about felons. See Rawlings v. The Hutchinson Pub-
lishing Co., 218 Kan. 295, 543 P.2d 988 (1975), citing Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420
U.S. 469 (1975) (upholding accurate broadcasting of information found in the public
record).
239. Prosser, supra note 4, at 397.
240. Prosser, supra note 4, at 393 n.88, 397 n.120.
241. Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975) (body surfer who allegedly ate
spiders, extinguished cigarettes in his mouth, and dove headfirst down flight of stairs).
242. Prosser, supra note 4, at 393 n.89.
243. Prosser, supra note 4, at 395 nn.109-11.
244. See supra note 239. Cases on pictures of nudity or anatomy generally involve a
breach of confidence, usually by a doctor. In Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir.
1975), the plaintiff had originally consented to a series of interviews but later withdrew
that consent.
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small group, but can be actionable if publicized at large.245 It
has been suggested that singling the plaintiff out of the crowd
is actionable,246 and that if the plaintiff's name can be left out of
the story, it should be.247 In general, if the publication is not
extensive, no action will lie.248 These suggestions parallel the
developing scope of consent analysis. The use of that analysis
would obviate the need for reaching "offensiveness" or "publi-
cation" issues under the public disclosure tort.
Another problem with the public disclosure tort is that the
standard which is developing to draw the line between tortious
and privileged disclosures--community mores of offensive-
ness-is not a good one.249 The community standard of offen-
siveness test is less protective of the plaintiff's reputational
interest than is defamation law. It is the lesson of history that
a loss to reputation is hard to prove.50 It is also a lesson of the
past that a plaintiff has a difficult time disproving a falsehood.
As a result, the plaintiff need not disprove the falsehood to es-
tablish defamation; instead, the burden is shifted to the de-
fendant by making truth a defense. However, falsity may be
important to show the negligence or "offensiveness" of the
publication (for instance, that a story was embellished) or to
show the lack of public value; therefore, these burdens will still
fall on the plaintiff.25 ' At the same time, the vagueness of the
standard could encourage many nuisance suits and trivial
claims, as well as exploitation of the publicity surrounding
such suits, simply because of the difficulty of achieving sum-
245. Prosser, supra note 4, at 393-94.
246. Prosser, supra note 4, at 395; see also Bloustein, supra note 6, at 979 n.107.
247. Franklin, supra note 234, at 128-131; Prosser, supra note 4, at 396. See Byron,
Harless, Schaffer, Reid and Assocs, Inc. v. State, 360 So. 2d 83, 98 (Fla. App. 1978). Cf.
Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931).
248. Prosser, supra note 4, at 393-94; Bloustein, supra note 6, at 980-81.
249. Unfortunately, the standard has some impressive constitutional analogues. In
recent obscenity cases, the Supreme Court has relied upon a jury applying contempo-
rary community standards to determine when the material is unprotected. See, e.g.,
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). The analogy to the obscenity cases is mislead-
ing, however. Pornography is farther from the core of the first amendment than is
news. A community standards test is less chilling on core values, and is perhaps more
tolerable when applied to pornography than when applied to news. In addition, the
obscenity decisions include a "serious (social) value" test, which is not solely a ques-
tion of fact. See KAmIsAR, LAFAVE AND Sco'rr, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1030, (West, 4th ed.
1975). There appears to be no corresponding "public issue" requirement in the devel-
oping public disclosure cases.
250. This is the reason for presumed damages in defamation actions. See, e.g.,
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 394 n.30 (1974) (White, J., dissenting).
251. Cf. Keeton, supra note 191 at 1235; see also Wade, supra note 7, at 1112.
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mary judgment.25 2 Thus, both deserving plaintiffs and defend-
ants may lose. Also, the community standard of
"offensiveness" does not do justice to the first amendment in-
terest. It does not protect truth. As a defense, it is not as clear
as the standard of truth or other conceivable privacy stan-
dards, 213 and hence, has a greater chilling effect and is more
likely to be applied for non-privacy reasons. In cases involving
national publications or broadcasts, local community stan-
dards result not in local standards, but in one national stan-
dard based on the most restrictive locality. The damages due
to that one violation may make the costs for presentation of the
information too high. This problem may be mitigated some-
what if states define their public disclosure tort to place less
restriction on speech, but any restriction on speech will be
acutely felt because core values are involved and because the
"offensiveness" standard is open to manipulation for non-pri-
vacy reasons.
The basic problem with the public disclosure tort, however,
is not that it is unnecessary or improperly defined, but that it
may be unconstitutional because it does not allow truth to be a
defense.5 4 If the first amendment protects all ideas, a funda-
mental element of most theories on free speech,255 arguably
true facts must be protected, for they are essential to the for-
mation of ideas and opinions. False facts are not essential to
this end, and are therefore not protected, except to the extent
that the "robust" nature of free speech allows errors or exag-
geration.256 The argument for protecting private facts is that
the privacy interest is strong and the speech interest (in ex-
pressing and forming ideas based on these facts) is attenu-
ated-being far from the political arena-and on balance, the
252. Kalven, supra note 109, at 338-39.
253. E.g., That the disclosure is "unwarranted", Warren and Brandeis, supra note 1,
at 218-19; that the disclosure affects reputation, discussed infra note 260; an intrusion
standard, supra notes 238-47; and a standard analogous to the constitutional right of
privacy, suggested infra notes 263-69.
254. E.g., Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979). The Court struck
down a state statute which imposed criminal penalties for the truthful publication of
an alleged juvenile delinquent's name lawfully obtained by a newspaper as violative of
the paper's first amendment interests. See Franklin, The Origins and Constitutionality
of Limitations on Truth as a Defense in Tort Law, 16 STAN. L. REV. 789, 817 (1964).
255. See A. MEIKEIJOHN, POLIICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE
PEOPLE (1960).
256. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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privacy right should be respected.257 This argument presumes
that some ideas are not valuable to public debate, without let-
ting the "marketplace of ideas" make that determination.2 8
This is dangerous for a variety of reasons. First, the presump-
tion is based on the fallacy that when the facts are private and
not of public interest, the free speech interest is the same, re-
gardless of the truth. It has, in fact, been suggested that in
some situations the false light and public disclosure causes of
action could be brought without any need to determine which
is technically applicable.259 The privacy interest is considered
257. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
258. Franklin, supra note 254, at 812-13.
259. Wade, supra note 7, at 1120-1. Arguably, the Supreme Court has been heading
toward this result in recent defamation cases. Beginning with New York Times v. Sul-
livan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the Court had been moving in the same direction, to a stan-
dard that in areas of public interest, the press has a privilege of printing even false
facts as long as there is no reckless or intentional disregard for the truth.
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), however, the Court limited this
privilege to stories on public officials or public figures and applied a negligence stan-
dard to the defamation of private persons. Although the Court appears to hold that
both tiers of speech-that concerning private persons as well as public figures-are
protected by the first amendment, the result from applying the two tests is the same if
the negligence standard is viewed not as a lesser privilege, but rather, as marking the
boundary between protected and unprotected speech. The Court is drawing the same
lines between privilege and privacy as the false light tort does between liability and
non-liability-negligence as to the falsity of the speech. Wade, supra note 7, at 1112-13.
The result is that while a privilege exists if the defendant is not negligent, regardless of
the privilege, there is no liability for the tort. If the defendant is negligent, there is no
privilege and liability does attach. The privilege thus adds nothing to the result.
The extension of this negligence standard to a community standards test as the first
amendment threshold has already been suggested. Christie, supra note 51, at 64. As
has been noted, if a fact is truly private, under Prosser's schema it will be actionable
regardless of truth under either the false light or public disclosure label, absent some
privilege. But if the Gertz privilege is made to depend upon whether the community
standard for privacy has been violated, instead of negligence as to its falsity, a clever
synthesis has occurred. Two areas of the law have been joined, for public disclosure of
a private fact (true or false) generates liability and no privilege, while public disclo-
sure of a non-private fact generates no liability and privilege. Thus, where there is no
Gertz privilege, there would be liability under the combined false light/public disclo-
sure tort, and where there would be privilege, no liability would attach.
This schema would help explain some interesting problems involving Gertz. First,
the Gertz standard was not simply negligence, but at least negligence (no "liability
without fault"). This standard meshes nicely with definitions of the standard found in
false light or public disclosure cases-ranging from negligence to offensive and inten-
tional disclosures-which always require at least negligence and sometimes more to
give the first amendment greater deference. Wade, supra note 7, at 1112-16; Prosser,
supra note 4, at 397, 400. Second, Gertz added that in defamation actions by private
plaintiffs, no damages could be presumed. In defamation actions by public plaintiffs,
the traditional rule would still apply: proof of damages could be presumed. In privacy
actions, proof of actual damages has always been required. Wade, supra note 7, at
1112-16; Prosser, supra note 4, at 409. These changes in effect rewrote defamation of
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the same. The first amendment interest, however, is quite dif-
ferent. An idea based on truth is worth more than one based
on falsity. Second, this presumption that ideas based on pri-
vate facts are not valuable to public debate is also unrealistic.
In practice, to determine that a fact or idea is private and not of
general value a priori is not possible. What appears to be an
isolated, private fact may be the piece in a puzzle that leads to
significant public facts.260 Suppression may also be harmful in
itself, regardless of its place in any puzzle, because of the
stigma that information is being withheld. Third, this pre-
sumption invites use contrary to the public interest. It permits
those who wish to suppress these ostensibly private facts to
refrain from disclosing information which would aid in the in-
private persons into a false light tort, except for some spurious results which derive
from using an "offensiveness" instead of a loss-of-reputation standard. See supra text
accompanying note 216; cf. Nimmer's idea infra note 260. Similarly, except for the
same spurious results, the false light tort for public figures is the same as defamation.
Thus, the troublesome false light tort has been neatly divided into a defamation tort
and a public disclosure tort of true or false facts.
Third, this schema would explain certain decisions subsequent to Gertz. Gertz sug-
gested that the recklessness standard would apply to any public figure, defined to be
one who attempts to influence the resolution of a public issue and who can command
channels of communication to rebut false charges. The public nature of the issue
would be important only to determine if the plaintiff has entered the public arena;
certainly it was reasonable to expect that one who actively sought publicity had so
entered the arena. But this is not necessarily so. In a subsequent case involving the
divorce of a society woman, the Court held that she was not a public figure even
though she sought publicity and held news conferences (in order to rebut falsehoods).
Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976). This decision appears highly unprincipled.
Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting); see Christie, supra note 51, at 54; but see infra text ac-
companying notes 271-73. In another case, three obscure employees in a labor dispute
were held to be subject to the recklessness standard merely because they were in-
volved in a labor dispute. Old Dominion v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974); see Christie,
supra note 51, at 50-51. Evidently, although the Gertz Court said it applies the two
standards based on whether the plaintiff is a public or private figure and that the na-
ture of the issue is not determinative, it actually applied the two standards based upon
whether the issue is public or private. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346. Facts in a labor dis-
pute, such as whether the employees were crossing union lines, are not private; facts
in a divorce, unlike those in public proceedings such as rape, (See, e.g., Cox Broadcast-
ing Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), where the Supreme Court held that the accurate
publication of the publicly recorded name of a crime victim or, implicitly, of an accused
or convicted criminal cannot be actionable under any circumstances), are private
when they involve intimate details of the personal relations of the married couple.
(The key fact in Firestone was an allegation of adultery.) In other words, the cases
could be said to parallel the results in a public disclosure action. As has been noted,
one theme in the public disclosure cases is that the defendant has simply gone too far.
In Firestone, the court intimated that if the same facts had not been published nation-
ally but only in the Palm Beach community where all of this was of concern, the report
might have been privileged. 424 U.S. at 453.
260. Franklin, supra note 253 at 822-23.
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vestigation of corruption or moral failing of the powerful but
private people in our society.
These constitutional problems could be obviated under sev-
eral theories. Arguably, disclosure of private facts, like pornog-
raphy, commercial speech or false facts, does not merit first
amendment protection.26 ' Alternatively, restrictions on speech
are appropriate if they can be characterized as reasonable
time, place, and manner restrictions and if the underlying
ideas can be freely expressed.262 The first amendment does
not protect "speech", but "freedom of speech"; this means that
everything worth saying should be said, not that everyone
should speak.263 Perhaps this test can be used to resurrect the
public disclosure tort within the first amendment. Certainly,
many public disclosure cases do not restrict the publication of
facts and ideas, but only a particular manner of publication;
however, other cases do involve absolute censure. Another ap-
proach is suggested by a recent trend in Supreme Court cases:
the first amendment can be limited when it competes with an-
other fundamental right. In Nebraska Press Association v. Stu-
art,264 the court disallowed restrictions on pre-trial disclosure
but suggested that in extreme circumstances, where necessary
to lessen the prejudicial impact, certain restraints may be al-
lowed.26 In Gannett v. DePasquale,26 6 the Court found such
circumstances and limited the right of access of the press to a
pretrial judicial hearing. Other recent decisions indicate that
there is a fundamental, constitutional right of privacy to make
certain "private" decisions, such as whether to use contracep-
261. See Nimmer, The Right to Speak From Times to Time: First Amendment Theory
Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935 (1968). Nimmer sug-
gests that a private fact is one which, though known to the immediate participants, is
unknown to any number of casual observers ... ." Id. at 960 n.86. Nimmer's theory,
as he indicates by the following hypothetical, posits that even when truthful, disclo-
sure of a private fact may be injurious. The publication of a picture of a nude woman,
taken surreptitiously, with no defamatory imputation of complicity or consent, clearly
would be actionable as an intrusion. Now what if the woman's face were appended to a
picture of a nude body and published? This is not an intrusion, and while her distress
due to the public's reaction (snickering?) is the same, this event is not as harmful; she
is still free in her own home from intrusions. But she might as well not be free, for the
public effect is the same. Arguably, however, it may be that such a publication would
be defamatory because of the imputation of consent. Id. at 963.
262. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
263. A. MEIKELJOHN, supra note 255.
264. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
265. Id. at 617 (Stevens, J., concurring).
266. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
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tives267 or to have an abortion,268 free from government inter-
ference. Arguably, where public disclosure of certain facts
would chill the exercise of these decisions, a private cause of
action is appropriate and allowable under state law. The ad-
vantage of this approach is that it would cover only the core
areas of privacy and, accordingly, would have a less chilling ef-
fect on other speech.2 6 9 One disadvantage of this approach is
illustrated in the following hypothetical: can an anti-abortion
group publish the names of people who have abortions, in an
effort to chill the exercise of that right? The type of speech
used here is not only in the core area of privacy, it is political
speech of the sort protected by the first amendment. It is quite
analogous to government regulations which require teenagers
to notify their parents before undergoing an abortion.270 This
demonstrates the problem with not allowing truthful speech to
be protected. But perhaps the anti-abortionists' point could be
made in a less offensive manner. This is, of course, what War-
ren and Brandeis suggested.271 Since the very matters about
which they were worried-gossip on intimate affairs, marriage
and sex-are those in the core area of the constitutional right
of privacy, this approach to their tort may satisfy both the pri-
vacy and first amendment interests.
The best approach, however, is to change the focus of the
public disclosure tort from the nature of the facts disclosed to
the manner of discovery-that is, the developing methodology
should be incorporated within the public disclosure tort. The
crucial question would be to ascertain the scope of consent for
the use of the facts by determining whether the plaintiff has
acted so as to thrust these private facts into the public arena.
Recent defamation cases have conformed to this developing
method of analysis and point the direction in which the com-
mon law should proceed to determine what is protectable pri-
vacy. In Wolston v. Reader's Digest Association,272 the plaintiff
267. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
268. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
269. Cf. the intrusion analysis infra note 274. Since the constitutional right of pri-
vacy lacks textual delineation, the privacy analogy should be narrowly construed.
270. Of course, state laws requiring all unmarried minors to seek parental consent
for an abortion, with no provision allowing "mature minors" to go directly to the court
for permission without first consulting or notifying parents, are unconstitutional. Bel-
lotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
271. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1 at 214-10.
272. 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
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was once accused of espionage, but sixteen years later was not
found to be a public figure because he had never voluntarily
thrust himself into the forefront of the particular public contro-
versy, and indeed had led a thoroughly private existence
before and after the original controversy. In Hutchinson v.
273Proxmire, a research scientist whose funding by various fed-
eral agencies on a particular project was publicized as an ex-
ample of egregious waste was similarly found not to be a public
figure because he "did not thrust himself or his views into pub-
lic controversy to influence others." '274 The Court is focusing
not on the newsworthiness or public nature of the alleged defa-
mation, but on what the plaintiff has done to protect or relin-
quish his privacy. Similarly, in the related context of
disclosure of private facts, the focus should be on the extent to
which the plaintiff has dedicated the disclosed facts to the pub-
lic; in other words, the focus should be the same as that of the
developing method of analysis.
III
Conclusion
This analysis of Prosser's right of privacy indicates that a re-
vision is in order. Appropriation does not protect privacy, but
publicity. False light protects the same interest as defamation,
and perhaps not as well. Public disclosure in its present form
poorly serves both the privacy and first amendment interests it
balances and may be unconstitutional in any form. Intrusion
should be narrowed to cover only the seeing, hearing, and gath-
ering of information from private areas. Most of all, regardless
of which of the four torts a privacy situation falls into, if any,
the analysis of the situation should proceed by the scope of
consent standard, and protection should not be afforded those
uses of information which go beyond the purposes for which
they were dedicated to the public. By using this analysis, espe-
cially in the context of the consensual relationship between
the plaintiff and defendant, many of the other interests, espe-
cially public disclosure interests, could be protected. This
analysis fully protects privacy and provides clear standards for
use by the press. Using the concept of a scope of consent to
cover disclosure of private facts for limited purposes could be a
273. 443 U.S. 111, 135 (1979).
274. Id.
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powerful tool to protect privacy. It focuses on the key harm to
privacy-the revelation of hidden information-instead of pe-
ripheral injuries, such as harm to reputation. To the extent
this analysis suffers from lack of precedent and indefinite stan-
dards, definition can be supplied by analogy, as with fourth
amendment, trade secret and breach of confidence cases. 75 In
addition, the privacy interests of the parties can be analyzed in
the context of the parties' relationship, using the present body
of law regarding duties arising from that relationship. This tort
would have the advantage, with respect to first amendment in-
terests, of being based on the manner of discovery of the infor-
mation, not on the nature of the fact. This concept of intrusion
restores the "dignity" that Warren and Brandeis attributed to
the right of privacy: it protects not reputation, mental distress
or property, but rather privacy, pure and simple, and the con-
trol over that privacy.
In conclusion, this analysis provides a bright light to end the
privacy confusion. Its clear conceptual limits give the courts
the necessary framework to guide the law of privacy wisely in
the future, especially as society and its norms of privacy be-
come increasingly complex.
275. See Note, A Reconsideration of the Katz Expectation of Privacy Test, 76 MICH.
L. REV. 154 (1977).
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